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Abstract
Past studies on engineering changes have focused on products other than defense aerospace
products, and have concentrated primarily on the design-manufacturing interface within single
companies. Thus, engineering changes in the context of US defense aerospace product
development - where the user community, the acquisition community, and the contractors share
the responsibility for developing a product - remain largely unexplored.
This research focused on three defense aircraft acquisition program case studies, referred to
hereafter as Programs A, B, and C. The primary goal of these studies was to develop a better
understanding of the causes and impacts of Class I engineering changes in the US defense
aerospace product development context. Class I engineering changes, simply referred to as
engineering changes below, are those that fundamentally modify the form, fit, and/or function of a
product such that the results before and after the engineering changes are different, and are visible
to all communities involved with developing the product. In addition, this research sought to
identify ways in which contractors and customers may help to reduce the number of undesirable
engineering changes.
For the three case-study programs, requirements definition issues, changes in user needs, the need
to fix deficiencies, and technological changes were found to be the four dominant causes of
engineering changes. It was also found that program characteristics determined the dominant
causes in each of the programs. Engineering changes due to the four dominant causes across the
three case-study programs were found to be most likely of high-impact. The scope of impact of
engineering changes remained relatively constant with respect to time, and engineering changes
rarely led to subsequent, unanticipated engineering changes. Thorough requirements definition
facilitated by the use of integrated product teams (IPTs), prioritization on program schedule, and
the use of mature technologies combined to allow Program C to make frequent engineering
changes to accommodate evolving user needs and changes in technology without any program
schedule delay. It was also found that had IPTs been used during the development phases of
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1. Introduction and Overview
1.1 Problem Overview
The primary purpose of this research is to develop guidelines for reducing defense
aerospace product development cycle time and cost. The research documented in this thesis
builds on the earlier work of Hernandez'. Based on empirical data from a total of three
commercial and defense aircraft program case studies, Hernandez found that while a combination
of common databases with 3D capability, multi-functional teams, and concurrent engineering
have contributed to reductions in the number of rework cycles, measured as the number of
engineering changes per initial design drawing release2, it was not clear whether there was a driver
among the three factors3 . The follow-up study of Hernandez's earlier work was originally meant
to discern which of the factors - common databases with 3D capability, multi-functional teams,
and concurrent engineering - may have contributed to the reduction in the number of rework
cycles, or engineering changes.
The literature review conducted as a part of the research reported here led to two
conclusions. First, other than the work of Hernandez, the majority of past studies of engineering
changes have not focused on the US defense aerospace product development environment.
Second, most of these studies have concentrated on the design-manufacturing interface.
An important implication of these two conclusions is that engineering changes reflective
of the characteristics of the US defense acquisition and aerospace product development
environment remain largely unexplored. A simplified view of the US defense acquisition and
aerospace product development environment is shown in Figure 1-1 to represent the sharing of
responsibilities over a defense product development program by the user community
("Operation"), the acquisition community ("Advisory Committee"), and the contractors
I Hernandez, Christopher M. Challenges and Benefits to the Implementation ofIntegrated Product Teams on Large
Military Procurements. MIT Master of Science in Management Thesis, June 1995.
2 Hernandez: 1995, p.3 6 .
3 Hernandez: 1995, p. 1 10 .
("System Management")4 . Much of the previous efforts that studied engineering changes, by
concentrating on the design-manufacturing interface, largely ignored the many other interfaces
that characterize the defense aerospace product development environment.
OPERATION: ADVISORY
COMMITTEE:








Figure 1-1: Simplified view of the US defense acquisition environment
Class I engineering changes 5 are those that fundamentally modify the form, fit, and/or
function of the product in such a way that the functionalities or physical configuration of the
product are different before and after the change. They represent an important element of the
defense aerospace product development environment and process in terms of cycle time and cost
in product development. Because of these characteristics, a Class I engineering change made to a
defense product is visible to all the communities involved in developing that product, and it is
reviewed and processed by these communities for approximately 90 days6
As implied in the preceding discussion, there are at least two approaches to studying the
relationship between engineering changes and defense aerospace product development cycle time
4 The figure and the discussion are based on Ellis, David 0. and Fred Ludwig. Systems Philosophy. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962, p.93, and from Blanchard, Benjamin S. System Engineering Management. New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1991, pp.2 5 1-2 5 3 .
5 For US defense acquisition, Class I engineering changes have been governed by MIL-STD-480B Configuration
Control - Engineering Changes, Deviations and Waivers. 15 July 1988. MIL-STD-480B has been superseded by
MIL-STD-973.
and cost. The first approach is to focus on the design-manufacturing interface within single
organizations. This approach has been frequently used in the past as already indicated. The
second approach is to understand the fundamental realities characterizing the defense acquisition
and aerospace product development environment, and the relationships between this
environment and Class I engineering changes. The latter approach focuses on a higher level set of
issues and questions than those involved in the design-manufacturing interface. The research
pursued in this thesis follows the second approach. This allows for a modification of the follow-
up study of Hernandez's earlier work by taking a step back to gain a fundamental understanding
of engineering changes that are visible to multiple communities in the defense acquisition and
aerospace product development context.
1.2 Research Objectives
This research was conducted with two objectives in mind. One objective was to
contribute knowledge to the area of engineering changes. by concentrating on the fundamental
nature - causes and impacts - of Class I engineering changes in the context of US defense
aerospace product development. The second objective was to develop guidelines for reducing
defense aerospace product development cycle time and cost.
1.3 Key Questions
Several key questions were addressed, with the goal of achieving the research objectives.
These questions are:
* What are the causes and impacts of Class I engineering changes?
* What are specific product development practices that would help reduce the number of
undesirable engineering changes?
* What can the acquisition customer organizations do to reduce the number of undesirable
engineering changes?
6 Based on data a Defense Contracts Management Command (DCMC) representative showed to the researcher during
a 14 April 1998 site visit to a prime contractor's facility.
For the remainder of the thesis, unless explicitly stated otherwise, the term "engineering
change" refers to a Class I engineering change.
1.4 Research Design: An Overview
The research documented in this thesis is based on case studies focusing on three major
USAF aircraft programs in the electronics sector. All three programs, designated as Programs A,
B, and C for the purposes of this thesis, are the responsibility of a single System Program Office
(SPO). Data on 118 engineering changes7 were collected from contractor-submitted Class I
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) archived at the SPO. In addition, supporting documents
pertaining to the three programs, as well as to the specific systems and subsystems within each
of the three programs, were collected in order to assist in developing a comprehensive
understanding of these engineering changes. Finally, 54 engineers and managers from prime
contractors and the program offices were interviewed to obtain their perspectives on the
programs and the engineering changes. The causes and impacts of specific engineering changes
were determined through a detailed examination of the data from these sources. Finally, broader
interpretations and conclusions were drawn from the collected database.
1.5 Highlights of Research Findings
The key findings based on Programs A, B, and C are highlighted here. They pertain to the
causes and impacts of Class I engineering changes, and the roles of the contractors and the
customer in reducing defense aerospace product development cycle time and cost.
Two key findings pertaining to the causes of engineering changes on the three case-study
programs are highlighted here. The four dominant causes of engineering changes across the three
programs were found to be the design assumptions made in the initial phases of the programs,
evolution of user needs as programs progressed over time, the need to correct design/product
deficiencies, and changes in technology. However, the combinations of dominant causes were
This number, 118, includes two engineering changes that applied to more than one program.
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different from program to program, and were strongly dependent on the characteristics of the
individual programs.
Some examples of findings pertaining to the impacts of engineering changes on the case-
study programs are highlighted below. These findings were determined based on seven areas, or
ways, in which the program and communities, depicted in Figure 1-1, could be affected by
engineering changes. For example, it was found that engineering changes almost always increase
the near-term cost of the programs. It was also found that engineering changes seldom led to
additional, unanticipated, engineering changes. Furthermore, in terms of product performance, it
was found that engineering changes most often resulted in meeting performance expectations -
either by meeting shifted expectations or by meeting originally specified expectations.
The pair-wise relationships between causes and impacts of engineering changes in the
three case-study programs, and time, in terms of when during a program an engineering change
was made, were also explored. It was found that the engineering changes due to the four
dominant causes identified above were most likely to be of high-impact - at least four out of
seven areas were affected by such engineering changes. Furthermore, the mean (average) number
of areas impacted by engineering changes in the three case-study programs remained relatively
constant over time. Finally, no particular relationship between the causes of engineering changes
and time was found across the three case-study programs.
This research also identified some lessons learned about the possibility of reducing
undesirable engineering changes and undesirable impacts of engineering changes. The prime
contractor's use of integrated product teams (IPTs), for development-related activities, were
found to help reduce the proportion of engineering changes that were due primarily to
requirements definition. Furthermore, in Program C, it was found that by properly defining
requirements early in the program, it was possible to quickly respond to changes in user needs
and technology and accommodate them by making engineering changes. Several factors may have
enabled Program C to make these engineering changes without program schedule delay. These
include recognition of program schedule as a priority, the ability to properly define major
requirements early in the program, and the use of mature technologies.
Some experiences of Programs A and B illustrated the importance of having prime
contractors understand the capabilities and limitations of their key suppliers. Despite the fact
that key suppliers were involved early on in these two programs, some design requirements were
not well understood among the parties, and redesigns became necessary later. Some redesigns
were sufficiently serious that they severely impacted the suppliers. The use of IPTs on these
two programs might have enabled the prime contractors to have greater understanding of their
key suppliers' capabilities and clarify some of the key requirements early in the programs,
thereby avoiding some engineering changes that severely impacted the key suppliers.
The customer also had a role to play in reducing undesirable engineering changes and
undesirable impacts of engineering changes. The Program B case study showed that having two
associate contractors - essentially two prime contractors - during the development phase, with
the customer as integrator, increased the risk of information disconnect between the two
contractors who must cooperate to develop the product. In addition this dual-prime arrangement
sometimes required two engineering changes to deal with one issue. The Program C case study
also showed that the use mature technology, when feasible, helped enable frequent engineering
changes to achieve incremental product improvement with no program schedule delay.
1.6 Thesis Outline
This section outlines the remainder of the thesis by identifying the main thrusts of each
subsequent chapter. Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical basis for the research. It highlights the
review of some engineering change-related publications, discusses the foundation of the research
in systems engineering, compares the characteristics of Class I and Class II engineering changes in
the context of defense product development, and reviews frameworks by which causes and
impacts of engineering changes have been studied in the past. Chapter 3 describes the research
method, the database collected for this research, and data analysis frameworks and procedures
employed in this research. Chapter 4 describes the characteristics of the three case-study
programs, and relates the causes of engineering changes in these programs to program
characteristics. Chapter 5 focuses on the impacts of engineering changes. Based on the data
presented in Chapters 4 and 5, Chapter 6 explores the pair-wise relationships between causes of
engineering changes, impacts of engineering changes, and time. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the
thesis by reviewing the research process and the findings, discussing the limitations of the
research, and recommending directions for future work.
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2. Background and Overview of Previous Work
This chapter establishes the theoretical background of the research. Section 2.1 first
explains, in a problem statement format, the motivation for the research. Section 2.2 provides an
overview of previous work in the area of engineering changes in order to identify gaps in
knowledge. Section 2.3 introduces several systems engineering concepts and practices that
guided the research, and Section 2.4 identifies the particular class of engineering changes studied
in the research. Finally, Sections 2.5 and 2.6 examine the specific ways in which causes and
impacts of engineering changes have been previously studied.
2.1 Problem Statement
While engineering changes have been identified as factors impacting product development
in various industries, very few studies have addressed engineering changes in the context of US
defense aerospace product development. In order to contribute to the knowledge base in this
area, the research documented in this thesis concentrates on the causes and impacts of engineering
changes that are reflective of US defense aerospace product developments. The research also
attempts to develop guidelines for reducing product development cycle time and cost in this
context.
2.2 Overview of Engineering Change-Related Work
This section highlights results of the literature review that provided the primary direction
for this research. These results are discussed in terms of research setting, and product
development interfaces studied. Details of eight particularly relevant publications in the area of
engineering changes are summarized in Appendix A.
2.2.1 Highlights of Literature Review
Research Setting
From a sample of available engineering change-related publications, it is interesting to note
that little work have been done in the US defense aerospace product development environment.
While a subset of these studies8 examined engineering changes in various industries including
aerospace, they did not focus specifically on the defense aerospace industry. Consequently, it
may be difficult to extract lessons learned about engineering changes from such broadly-set
studies. On the other hand, some narrowly-focused studies concentrated on commercial
products, such as automobiles and photocopiers 9, that did not directly pertain to the defense
aerospace product development environment. As a result, it may still be difficult to extrapolate
lessons learned about engineering changes to the defense aerospace product development
environment. Furthermore, the only study performed on the aerospace industry focused on the
commercial aircraft sector lo. Since the problems facing the commercial aircraft sector may be
significantly different from those facing the defense aerospace sector, it may not be valid to
extend lessons learned from such a study to the defense aerospace sector.
Product Development Interfaces Studied
A review of the eight publications that focused on engineering changes also indicated that
much of the previous work has addressed engineering changes in terms of the design-
manufacturing interface. This was evident in Hegde et al.", Ettlie12, Coughlan 13, Hooper 14, and
8 An example is such studies was Ettlie, John E. "Early Manufacturing Involvement in New Product Development".
Proceedings of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Engineering Management Conference,
1995, pp.104-109. Another example was Fricke, Ernst, Bernd Gebhard, et al. "No Innovation without Changes,
but..." Proceedings of the Seventh Annual International Symposium of the International Council on Systems
Engineering, Vol. 1. August 3-7, 1997, Los Angeles, CA. pp.6 0 1 -608. According to an in-person conversation
with Fricke conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 17 July 1998, this research was based on
interviews conducted at 20 German companies across a number of industries, including aerospace.
9 Barkan, Philip. "Productivity in the Process of Product Development - An Engineering Perspective". Integrating
Design and Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage, Gerald Susman, Ed. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 1992, pp.5 6-6 8 .
o10 Hooper, Eric Allen. Improving the Boeing 777 Program's Corrective Action Process. MIT Master of Science in
Electrical Engineering and Master of Science in Management Thesis. May 1996.
" Hegde, G. G., Sham Kekre, and Sunder Kekre. "Engineering changes and time delays: A field investigation".
International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 28, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1992. pp.3 4 1-3 5 2 .
12 Ettlie, John E. "Early Manufacturing Involvement in New Product Development ". Proceeding of the IEEE
Engineering Management Conference, 1995. pp. 10 4 -10 9 .
13 Coughlan, Paul D. "Engineering Change and Manufacturing Engineering Deployment in New Product
Development". Integrating Design and Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage, Gerald Susman, Ed. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1992.
14 Same as Footnote 10.
Wright15. Indeed, Wright indirectly observed the predominance of the design-manufacturing
interface in engineering change-related studies based a close examination of 23 engineering change-
related papers16. However, as shown in Figure 1-1, there are more possible interfaces among the
communities involved in defense aerospace product development than just the design-
manufacturing interface. Therefore, engineering change-related lessons learned in the
aforementioned studies may not be directly transferable to defense aerospace product
development.
2.2.2 Direction of Research
The gaps in knowledge identified above by the literature review suggested the direction of
the research reported here. The goal was to contribute new knowledge to the area of engineering
changes by concentrating specifically on engineering changes in the US defense aerospace product
development environment. In addition, since this environment can be characterized by the
sharing of product development responsibilities across the user community, acquisition
community, and the contractors as shown in Figure 1-1, the research may make a further
contribution by also examining the relationship between engineering changes and the interactions
among these communities.
2.3 Systems Engineering Concepts and Practices
Having identified the direction of research, it is useful to understand some concepts and
practices that relate to engineering changes in the defense aerospace product development
context. These concepts and practices include: systems, complexity, changes, systems
engineering, and configuration management. The following discussion explains the relevant
concepts and practices. Readers interested in more details can refer to the cited references.
15 Wright, I. C. "A review of research into engineering change management: implications for product design".
Design Studies, Vol. 18, 1997. pp.33-42.
16 Wright: 1997, p. 3 7 and p.41.
2.3.1 Relevant Concepts: System, Complexity, and Changes
It has been noted, at least since the 1950s 17 and 1960s' 8, that the weapon systems
acquired by the military services have become increasingly complex. It has also been predicted 9
that the complexity of weapon systems will increase to a point where no one company or
military service would have all the expertise to design, produce, and support a complete system.
Thus, the responsibilities of designing, producing, and supporting a system would become
increasingly shared by the user community, the acquisition community, the prime contractor, and
subcontractors20.
In order to better understand the concepts of system and complexity, they need to be
further explored. Ellis and Ludwig considered a system to be any device, procedure, or scheme
which follows certain rules to convert inputs to outputs, both of which may take the form of
information or materials 21. A system has also been considered as a collection of interrelated
elements whose functionality is greater than the sum of the independent element functionalities 22.
Just as a system can be broken down to its elements, a system can also be an element of a larger
system 23. The interactions among the interrelated elements, which may include "things" and
"people", of the devices, procedures, and schemes then characterize complexity24.
Changes are related to the concepts of system and complexity because in a complex
system a change to an element affects many other elements in a typically nonlinear fashion25.
Goode and Machol underscored the relationship between changes and complex systems by
asserting that a complex system is understood only if the nonlinear effects of changes on such a
17 As in, for example, Goode, Harry H. & Robert E. Machol. System Engineering: An Introduction to the Design of
Large-Scale Systems. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1957.
18 As in, for example, Ellis, David, O. & Fred J. Ludwig. Systems Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
Inc. 1962.
19 The prediction was made by Ellis & Ludwig: 1962, p. 9 2 .
20 The sharing of responsibilities by the different communities is based on Ellis & Ludwig: 1962, p.9 2 . The
specific mention of subcontractors is based on Blanchard, Benjamin S. System Engineering Management. New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991, pp. 2 52 -2 5 3 .
21 Ellis & Ludwig: 1962, p.3 .
22 Boppe, Charles W. "Systems Engineering Elements Addressing Complexity". MIT 16.870 Aerospace Product
Design lecture notes. Fall 1996.
23 Same as Footnote 22.
24 Based on discussion in Flood, Robert L & Ewart R. Carson. Dealing with Complexity: An Introduction to the
Theory and Application of Systems Science, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1993, pp.24 -2 5 .
system are understood 26. Therefore, these authors highlighted the value of studying the effects,
or impacts, of changes on systems in order to understand the complexity of systems.
The concepts of system, complexity, changes, and their relationship make it possible to
consider the defense aerospace product development process as a system whose elements - the
user community, the acquisition community, the prime contractor, and subcontractors - interact
with and affect each other. These elements and their interactions in turn affect the product they
are jointly developing. Consequently, it is also possible to extend Goode and Machol's assertion
to include understanding the causes of changes as a way to understand defense aerospace product
development complexity. Therefore, the research documented in this thesis studies both the
causes and impacts of changes, or more specifically, causes and impacts of engineering changes in
the defense aerospace product development environment.
2.3.2 Relevant Practices: Systems Engineering and Configuration Management
Systems engineering is an approach to dealing with the complexity of products and
processes. It is a top-down, iterative process of applying scientific and engineering knowledge to
transform customer needs into a physical product that satisfies the customer needs 27. Within
systems engineering, configuration management is a function that helps to ensure that as the
design undergoes the iterative process, the eventual product will fulfill the needs defined at the
beginning of the process.
One of the configuration management processes that is of particular interest to this
research is configuration control. It is a process for understanding, controlling, and monitoring
the changes which affect the configuration or documentation of a product2 8 . A very important
consequence of this definition is that an engineering change (or simply, a change) to a product can
include either or both a change to the product itself, and the documents describing the product.
25 Goode & Machol: 1957, pp.5-6 .
26 Goode & Machol: 1957, p. 6 .




28 Monahan, Ray E. Engineering Documentation Control Practices and Procedures. New York, NY: Marcel-
Dekker, Inc., 1995, p.57.
Engineering changes in the defense aerospace product development context are subjects of the
next section.
2.4 Engineering Changes in Defense Product Development
This section introduces engineering changes within the context of US defense aerospace
product development. Engineering changes in this context fall into the domain of configuration
control. Figure 2-1 attempts to illustrate the organization of systems engineering and the
hierarchy into which configuration control and engineering changes fit.




Figure 2-1: Engineering changes and systems engineering29
29 The figure is based on a similar figure in Boppe, Charles W. "Systems Engineering And Complexity". MIT
16.880 Systems Engineering lecture notes. 1997. Elements in the hierarchy below "Configuration Management"
are taken from Monahan, and Samaras, Thomas T. & Frank L. Czerwinski. Fundamentals of Configuration
Management. New York, NY: Wiley Interscience, 1971.
Based on MIL-STD-480B, an engineering change in defense product development may be
more precisely defined as "[a]n alteration in the approved configuration identification of a CI
[configuration item] under development, delivered, or to be delivered." 30  A configuration
identification is the set of documents, such as specifications, drawings, numbering systems, and
other references that describe the configuration item in terms of its functional and physical
characteristics31 . A configuration item is a design or a physical product, consisting of either or
both hardware and software, that performs a set of functions required by the customer 32.
The preceding discussion of engineering changes in the defense product development
context can be summarized in terms of two main ideas. First, a change to a design should be
thought of as both a modification that can be made to the physical manifestation of an idea, and a
modification to the rules (requirements, specifications) describing what functions that physical
manifestation must perform. Second, an engineering change can be made to a system or its
subsystems at any point during development, production, and operation phases, as the basic
definition indicated above.
2.4.1 Class I vs. Class II Engineering Changes
In MIL-STD-480B engineering changes are distinguished as Class I and Class II
engineering changes. This section discusses the distinction.
A Class I engineering change is one that affects a configuration item or its components33 in
such a way as to (a) correct deficiencies; (b) add or modify interface or interoperability
requirements; (c) make a significant effectiveness change in operational or logistics support
requirements; (d) achieve substantial life-cycle costs/savings; or (e) prevent slippage in an
approved production schedule 34. These engineering changes address the modifications that have
life cycle implications to the form, fit or function of a system or its subsystems. Furthermore,
30 Military Standard 480B (MIL-STD-480B) Configuration Control - Engineering Changes, Deviation, and
Waivers. 15 July 1988. Section 3.1.30.
31 MIL-STD-480B, Section 3.1.14.32 MIL-STD-480B, Section 3.1.15.
33 MIL-STD-480B, Section 5.1.
34 MIL-STD-480B, Section 5.1.2.
Class I engineering changes are apparent to the customer 35, and the functionality and/or physical
configuration of parts, components, and subsystems are not interchangeable before and after the
change 36. For example, the user community is likely to know how operational characteristics
resulting from an engineering change differed from those originally specified. Finally, if any
contractual factors such as cost-to-customer, contractual guarantees/warranties, deliveries, or
contract milestones are impacted, the engineering change must be a Class 137.
A Class II engineering change has been defined as one that is a minor modification,
transparent to the customer, made to a configuration item in production 38. The substitution of
parts from one company by identical parts from another company would be an example of a
Class II engineering change39 . Thus, the interchangeability of parts would be preserved before
and after the change 40
Table 2-1 summarizes the comparison between Class I and Class II engineering changes.
The distinctions come from the definitions and characteristics provided in the discussion above.
Class I Class II
Form, fit, function (includes Yes No
performance) change apparent to
customer
Qualitative distinction of scope of High Low
change's impact
Functionality and/or physical No Yes
configuration interchangeable before
and after change
Table 2-1: Summary of Class I vs. Class II engineering changes
2.4.2 Rationale for Studying Class I Engineering Changes
The characteristics of Class I engineering changes discussed above suggest their
compatibility with the objectives of this research. Since Class I engineering changes are most
35 This concept had also been discussed in Coughlan, Paul D. "Engineering Change and Manufacturing Engineering
Deployment in New Product Development." Integrating Design and Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 1992.
36 The interchangeability view of ECPs has been highlighted in Monahan, Ray E. Engineering Documentation
Control Practices and Procedures. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc. 1995. pp.8 3 -85 .37 MIL-STD-480B, Section 5.1c.38MIL-STD-480B, Section 5.2.MIL-STD-480B, Section 5.2.
often visible to the contractors and customers (including the user community and the acquisition
community), they were considered to be more likely to highlight the broader reasons within the
defense aerospace product development environment that rendered them necessary. Therefore,
they were selected, over Class II engineering changes, as the engineering changes of interest.
2.5 Existing Frameworks for Categorizing Causes of Engineering Changes
This section reviews four existing frameworks found in the literature and in practice for
categorizing causes of engineering changes. Since the previous sections have indicated the
importance of studying the causes and impacts of engineering changes in defense aerospace
product development, it is necessary to first understand how causes of engineering changes have
been examined and quantified in the past.
Before examining the frameworks themselves, there needs to be a set of criteria for
assessing the suitability of existing frameworks for use in studying causes of engineering changes
in defense aerospace product development. In light of the gaps in knowledge identified at the end
of Section 2.2, a framework that might be adopted for use in this research should examine various
product development issues, provide a systems view of US defense aerospace product
development, and extract lessons learned.
Table 2-2 shows a comparison of various frameworks in terms of the criteria stated
above. The details of each framework are included in Appendix B.
40 Same as Footnote 36
Examine a Variety of Provide Systems Extract Lessons
Product View of US Defense Learned.
Development Issues. Aerospace Product
Development.
Coughlan41 Employed for studying Limited to the design- Limited to the design-
engineering changes mfg. interface. mfg. interface, but
pertaining to capable of extracting
manufacturing (mfg.) lessons learned when
and the design-mfg. supported with
interface. additional data.
Fricke et al. 4 2  Addresses engineering Attention to both When combined with
changes throughout technical and engineering change
system life cycle. organizational issues data and the product
indicates that the development
framework does process/practices data,
provide a systems view. the framework enables
learning from existing
programs.
DCMC's Addresses engineering Too high-level to Enables monitoring by
Categorization of changes throughout reflect the decisions a single agency over
Class I ECPs43  system life cycle, parties make on many programs, but it
individual programs, cannot provide much
and the interactions detail and lessons about
among parties on these the individual
programs. programs.
MIL-STD-480B Class Addresses changes Provides systems view Enables monitoring
I ECP Justification throughout system life of defense aerospace over many ECPs, but is
Codes 4 4  cycle. product development, not explicitly linked to
program
characteristics.
Table 2-2: Comparison of existing frameworks for categorizing causes of engineering
changes
The review of existing frameworks for categorizing causes of engineering changes leads to
an important observation. Each framework appeared to have been tailored for its purpose, and
41 Coughlan, Paul D. "Engineering Change and Manufacturing Engineering Deployment in New Product
Development" Integrating Design' and Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage. Gerald Susman, Ed. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1992. pp. 1 6 5 .
42 Fricke, Ernst, Bernd Gebhard, et al. "No Innovation without Changes, but..." Proceedings of the Seventh Annual
International Symposium of the International Council on Systems Engineering, Vol. 1. August 3-7, 1997, Los
Angeles, CA. pp.601-608.
43 Details referred to here can be found in DCMC Metrics Guide Book, Fourth ed. Ft. Belvoir, VA. Downloadable
from World Wide Web as PDF file from http://www.dcmc.hq.dla.mil and follow the hot link "Metrics under the
column "Regulations & Manuals".
44 MIL-STD-480B Configuration Control - Engineering Changes, Deviations and Waivers. 15 July 1988. The
newer MIL-STD-973 is similar to, and superseded 480B, but no copy of 973 was available. Section 5.1.3 of 480B
defines each justification code.
appeared suitable for what it has been designed to do. Unfortunately, none of these purposes
exactly coincided with the objectives of this research. Therefore, none of these existing
frameworks are directly applicable to the research documented in this thesis. Consequently, it is
necessary to construct a new framework suitable for the objectives of this research, based on
components found in existing frameworks. This task will be performed in Chapter 3.
2.6 Existing Frameworks for Categorizing Impacts of Engineering Changes
A review of relevant literature and practices identified several domains, or areas, that have
been commonly recognized as having the potential to be affected (or impacted) by engineering
changes. This section discusses these domains, and now they will serve as bases for constructing
a framework for categorizing impacts of engineering changes for the research reported here.
Cost45 and schedule4 6 have been frequently mentioned as domains, or areas, that can be
impacted by engineering changes. For example, Fricke et al. have pointed out that while
engineering changes may increase cost and delay schedule, they can also reduce cost and advance
schedule47. In addition, Coughlan pointed out the issue of hidden costs related to scrap accounts,
purchase price variances, field service accounts, etc. 48. These issues may become more
complicated when multiple organizations are involved, as in the case of the US defense aerospace
product development environment.
The product itself is another domain that can be impacted by engineering changes. For
example, Fricke et al.49 state that the quality of the product might be enhanced as a result of an
engineering change.
Other possible impacts of engineering changes have also been identified in both the
literature and in practice. For example, subsequent engineering changes resulting from earlier
engineering changes have been identified as a possible impact. Goode & Machol, and Coughlan
45 For example, cost was specifically tied to return on investment in Ettlie: 1995, p.107. It was also identified as an
impact of engineering changes in Fricke et al.: 1997, p.602, Coughlan: 1992, p.
1 5 9
.
46 For example, schedule was specifically treated in Hegde et al.: 1992, p.3 4 2 as manufacturing time. It was also
identified as an impact of engineering changes in Fricke et al.: 1997, p. 60 2 .
47 Fricke et al. : 1997, p. 6 0 3 .
48 Coughlan: 1992, p. 1 5 9 .
49 Fricke et al. : 1997, p.6 0 3 .
warned about this effect by discussing the nonlinear effects of changes50 and "collateral changes
to other features" 51, respectively.
Finally, the Engineering Change Proposal forms in current use provide perhaps the most
comprehensive framework for studying the impacts of engineering changes. The US Department
of Defense Form 1692 series require the ECP-preparing company to identify other contractors,
specifications, cost-to-government, delivery schedule, labor hour expenditures from the user
community, and other life cycle elements that may be impacted by proposed engineering
changes52
The review of existing frameworks for categorizing impacts of engineering changes
suggests that there exists a relatively mature and complete basis on which to tailor a framework
suitable for the research documented in this thesis. The impact domains range from the simple
cost-and-schedule pair to the comprehensive set outlined in the DoD Form 1692 (formally DD
Form 1692) series.
2.7 Chapter Summary
A literature survey conducted as a first step of this research indicated that the research
may add insights into engineering changes in the defense aerospace product development
environment. The research should concentrate on causes and impacts of engineering changes that
are reflective of US defense aerospace product development, and infer guidelines for reducing
product development cycle time and cost in this context. In order to understand the role of
engineering changes in defense aerospace product development, this chapter then discussed the
systems engineering process to which engineering changes strongly relate. Finally, it reviewed
existing literature and practice for specific ways in which the causes and impacts of engineering
changes have been studied in the past, with the goal of preparing for the analysis of engineering
50 Goode & Machol: 1957, pp.5 -6 .
51 Coughlan: 1992, p. 15 8 .
52 For details about these fields, the readers can refer to MIL-STD-480B Configuration Control - Engineering
Changes, Deviations and Waivers. 15 July 1988.
change data collected for this research. The description of types of data collected and methods of
data analysis are subjects of the next chapter.
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3. Research Design
As outlined in Chapter 1, the primary goal of this research is to develop guidelines for
reducing defense aerospace product development cycle time and cost. The research seeks to
achieve this goal by providing an improved understanding of the causes and impacts of
engineering changes in the defense aerospace context by focusing on the following key questions:
* What are the causes and impacts of Class I engineering changes?
* What are specific product development practices that would help reduce the number of
undesirable engineering changes?
* What can the acquisition customer organizations do to reduce the number of undesirable
engineering changes?
This chapter describes the research strategy followed in addressing these questions.
Section 3.1 presents the research methodology, and Section 3.2 provides an overview of the data
collected. Next, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the frameworks for interpreting the collected
engineering change data with the goal of identifying and quantifying the causes and impacts of
engineering changes. Section 3.5 highlights the data analysis procedure. Section 3.6 summarizes
the key points of the chapter.
3.1 Research Method
3.1.1 Data Collection Setting
The research documented in this thesis focuses on engineering changes in three defense
aircraft programs, which serve as three case studies. For the purposes of this thesis, the three
programs are identified simply as Programs A, B, and C.
The three programs display certain similarities. First, all three programs are managed by
the same System Program Office (SPO). The SPO is responsible for a fleet of aircraft53, and
53 Some of these aircraft are in the US inventory and some are in the inventories of US allies.
33
serves as the interface between the user community 54 and the contractors in order to acquire55 the
products and services that the user community needs 56. Second, all three programs have
significant electronics emphasis. Third, the mission aircraft under the programs - including the
airframe and the electronics mission subsystems they carry - perform similar missions. Finally,
products of all three programs had already entered the production phase as of Summer 1997,
when the data collection effort for this research began.
These three programs also exhibit certain differences. First, the programs differ in terms
of their scope. For example, while one program (including its contractors) may be responsible for
developing upgrades to one major existing electronics mission subsystem carried in the aircraft,
another program (including its contractors) may be responsible for developing and building
complete mission aircraft (including the aircraft and the mission subsystems) from the ground up.
Both of these cases were observed among the three programs studied. Second, the programs57
may be managed differently. For example, two of the three programs began when concurrent
engineering and integrated product teams were simply not in use by either the government or
contractors. Third, individual programs managed by the same SPO may have employed very
different contractual terms and conditions affecting different programs. For example, two of the
three case-study programs had only one prime contractor during development, while a third had
two prime contractors during development. These programmatic differences may affect the
causes and impacts of engineering changes on the three programs, and they may provide insights
into how similar programs might be managed differently in the future.
3.1.2 Data Collection Process
The data collection process was carried out in two phases: the System Program Office
(SPO) phase and the prime contractors phase. The objective, in general, was to gain as much
54 In the context of the USAF, these are the people who operate and maintain the aircraft and aircraft subsystems.
For military aircraft, an "acquisition program" is responsible for the aircraft's research and development, design,
manufacturing and assembly, training and ground equipment, initial spares, and facility construction. See Boppe,
Charles W. "Complex Product Design Process." 16.870 Aerospace Product Design lecture notes. Fall 1996.
56 A detailed discussion about the SPO's responsibilities would take more space than is available here.
57 Once again, the distinction between government and contractor is blurred, and they are collectively referred to as
"the program".
insight as possible about engineering changes in defense aerospace product development from a
diverse set of perspectives.
The System Program Office Phase
With the benefit of extensive assistance from Air Force personnel, permission to conduct
on-site research had been obtained from the System Program Director's Office. Research
activities focused on collecting engineering change data from Engineering Change Proposals
(ECPs) archived within the programs58. From 15 July to 17 November 1997, ECP files were
obtained from the configuration manager of each program, and the entries were transcribed onto
Microsoft EXCEL and WORD files59 set up for each program. Written notes from discussions
and interviews with configuration managers, engineers, and program managers were recorded,
with the participants' permission, and later transcribed into the appropriate WORD files. In
addition, a separate WORD file was maintained for each program to document all notes
pertaining to specific engineering changes from that program.
The on-site data collection at the SPO provided the benefit of direct exposure to some
aspects of the acquisition community's role in defense aerospace product development. The
accessibility, expertise, and support of the SPO personnel were of great value to the research.
The Prime Contractors Phase
It was also necessary to learn about the three case-study programs and their engineering
changes from the perspectives of the contractors. Thus, between 05 February and 15 April
1998, one site visit was made to each of the three prime contractors, designated as Contractors X,
Y, and Z for the purposes of this thesis, of the three case-study programs. Each site visit lasted
no more than three working days. During these site visits, the data collection effort benefited
58 Since the SPO had been restructured, and integrated product teams (IPTs) were formed two years earlier, the ECP
files were moved to the respective IPTs that ran each program. However, the older half of Program A's ECPs were
found only in the archives of the SPO IPT responsible for contracting, not in the configuration management files of
the program IPT.
immensely from the expert assistance provided by the contractor engineers and managers of the
three case-study programs.
The purpose of both formally and informally interviewing the key contractor personnel
was to learn about the background, performance, the nature of the products, and the engineering
changes from the contractor perspective, for each of the three programs. Consequently, the
interviews and discussions emphasized the history of the programs, and the details of each
engineering change.
The treatment of the data collected at the contractor sites was similar to that of the data
collected at the SPO. A main difference, however, was that a site-visit report summarizing the
findings of each visit was composed and submitted to the company's contact person for review
for factual accuracy. This final step ensured the validity of information collected during these
visits.
The number and distribution of government and contractor personnel on specific
programs who were interviewed via face-to-face meetings are shown in Table 3-1. Additional
personnel who were not specifically associated a particular program were also interviewed: 3
represented the prime contractor companies, 6 represented the SPO, and 8 represented the
Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) stationed at the contractor sites. A total of
54 people were interviewed.
Program A Program B Program C
Program office 5 4 2
Prime contractor (s): 13 9 4
Table 3-1: Number and distribution of personnel interviewed in the three programs
3.2 Database Supporting the Research
The database developed as part of this research encompassed engineering change data, and
additional data about the three programs and their systems and subsystems. The data collection
59 EXCEL files were suitable for recording short entries taken from DD Form 1692 series for forms (the ECP forms).
WORD files complemented the EXCEL files by recording detailed descriptions, explanations, and notes from
interviews and discussions.
effort was designed to provide insights into the causes and impacts of engineering changes,
leading to a documentation of lessons learned about defense aerospace product development. All
data obtained were unclassified.
The database is organized according to four levels: the SPO level, each program level, a
systems and subsystems level, and an engineering change level. The four-level database structure
is shown in Figure 3-1. Under each program the total number of engineering changes, as
designated in Figure 3-1, includes all engineering changes approved or in review 60 by the SPO as
of 17 November 1997.
* Includes 2 that also applied to
Program A
Figure 3-1: Database structure
3.2.1 Engineering Change Data
Contractor-submitted Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) provided data on 118
engineering changes across the three programs. A breakdown of the engineering change data
collected is shown in Figure 3-2.


















































Figure 3-2: Elements of engineering change data
The engineering change data collected for this research were based mainly on the entries
on DD Form 1692 series of contractor-submitted Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) forms.
The ECP forms provided demographic data about the engineering changes. Important examples
of demographic data found on the ECP forms include: date of submission to the program office,
ECP identification and title, and levels of contracted specifications affected by the engineering
change. Two entries on the forms that were of particular interest to this research were the
"Description of Change" and "Need for Change" entries. They usually describe the background
of the engineering change and the relevant system and subsystem, and the reason(s) the
engineering change was necessary. The "Impacts" entries address cost to the customer due to the
engineering change, possible delivery schedule delays, and specifications affected. Other impact
areas also addressed by the ECP forms include aircraft performance (if applicable), and integrated
logistics support. Supplemental information came from a variety of sources. For example,
contractor may submit extra pages to further explain the cause of the engineering change. On the
other hand, the program office may attach its own interpretation of the engineering change to the
ECP file. Furthermore, SPO Configuration Control Board (CCB) decision regarding the approval
of an engineering change was usually recorded in the ECP file. Finally, as collected for this
research, notes from interviews and discussions held with government and contractor personnel
regarding a specific engineering change were kept with other data for that engineering change.
Several special aspects of the data should be noted. First, not all entries on the submitted
ECP forms were filled out. For example, when no actual product exists, an engineering change
can only apply to the documents describing the design of the product. Consequently, the
"retrofit labor hour" entry on the ECP form would be left blank. Second, it is extremely
important to note the type of cost identified in the ECP. Such cost data only capture an increase
or decrease in cost for the government; they do not account for the cost increase or decrease in
cost borne by, or internal only to, the contractor. In particular, it is not clear in these cases how
the costs are truly allocated or where the costs are actually borne.
3.2.2 Systems and Subsystems Data
Data pertaining to specific systems and subsystems provided a conceptual understanding
of the functionalities, physical configurations, and development processes of the products in the
three programs studied. Consequently, it also provided some technical appreciation for the
challenges of designing, producing, and fielding the products. Figure 3-3 provides a summary of
the database developed at the system and subsystems level. Sample questions that guided
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Figure 3-3: Elements of systems and subsystems data
The data on systems and subsystems were obtained from three sources. First, written
documents provided by the SPO and contractors described system functionalities and physical
configurations. Second, interviews and discussions with government and contractor personnel
provided insight into the background of the respective system development efforts. On many
occasions government and contractor personnel provided valuable clarification of the written
material. Third, the technical publications describing the systems and subsystems enabled a
deeper understanding of the engineering changes.
3.2.3 Program Data
Data pertaining to each of the three programs enabled a clear view of the roles and
responsibilities of the three individual program offices, the user community, the prime
contractors, and subcontractors (suppliers) in the product development process. In addition, the
program-level data provided a description of how the various parties involved in product
development on these three programs interacted with each other. Figure 3-4 shows the













































Figure 3-4: Elements of program data
The purpose of the types of data listed under the two left-hand-side boxes in Figure 3-4
is to understand the background of the three case-study programs from the perspectives of both
the contractors and the government program offices. On the government side, the data are
expected to provide a working understanding of the interactions among the program offices under
the same SPO. The inter-program relationships are important because they may have played a
role in driving the need for engineering changes. Furthermore, the cost and schedule data were
obtained from contract cover pages and updates at the program offices, as well as from other
program-related documents.
The two right-hand-side boxes in Figure 3-4 capture the inner workings of each program.
Similar data from the contractor perspective were obtained as part of the data collected at the
system and subsystems level, as summarized in Figure 3-3 and Appendix C.
I I
3.2.4 SPO Data
SPO data represent the highest level of data in the hierarchy discussed at the beginning of
Section 3.2. Figure 3-5 shows the elements of data collected at this level.
System Program
Office (SPO) Data
SPO Missions of the
responsibilities and aircraft Configuration
organizational managed by management
hierarchy SPO process at SPO
Figure 3-5: Elements of SPO data
SPO data provided high-level insight that enabled an understanding of the context of the
other levels of data discussed earlier. In general, the descriptive data addressed the functioning of
the System Program Office, and how the individual programs fit within the SPO. In addition,
written information also described, in general terms, the missions performed by the aircraft
managed by the SPO. Finally, the SPO-level data also included explanations of the configuration
management process.
3.3 Framework for Categorizing Causes of Engineering Changes
This section introduces the framework used in this research for categorizing the primary
causes61 of engineering changes. One of the characteristics of research using archival data, such as
the research documented in this thesis, is the need to translate the written records "into
quantifiable indices of some general concepts." 62  The proposed framework is based on the
review of existing frameworks found in the literature and in practice, as documented in Section
2.5.
61 The term "primary causes" is used to underscore the observation made during the data collection process that in
many cases a combination of causes, not a single cause, led to an engineering change. When "cause" is used, it
should be understood to be the primary cause.
62 Judd, Charles M., Eliot R. Smith, and Louise H. Kidder. Research Methods in Social Relations, 6th ed. Fort
Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1991. p.2 89 .
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The objectives of the research and the review of existing frameworks suggested that the
framework proposed here should encompass the following high-level causal categories: (1)
requirements-related issues; (2) the need to fix deficiencies; (3) program interaction; (4)
technological changes; and (5) documentation changes. Since one of the objectives of the research
was to understand the causes of engineering changes, the causal categories should explain why the
engineering change was needed, not what the engineering change was trying to accomplish63
3.3.1 The Framework for Categorizing Causes of Engineering Changes
Some of the high-level causal categories listed above appeared to be too broad to be useful
in explaining causes of engineering changes in terms of the specific characteristics of the three
case-study programs. For example, it was not apparent whether "requirements-related issues"
meant requirements definition problems, or shifts in user requirements. Similarly, "program
interaction" needed to be turned into more specific components. Therefore, appropriate
decomposition of these high-level causal categories was necessary for this research. Table 3-2
shows the resulting framework that was used in this research to categorize the causes of
engineering changes. The rationale for this categorization system is explained below.
63 The requirement is based on Balcerak, K. J. and B. G. Dale. "Engineering change administration: the key
issues." Computer-Integrated Manufacturing Systems, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1992. pp.125-132, where the authors made a
distinction between the purpose and the cause of an engineering change.
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1 Requirements definition issues*
A. Traceable to program initiation
B. Traceable to a previous change
2 Changes in needs*
A. New needs identified
B. Needs definitized
3 Need to fix deficiencies
A. Modify design or product
4 Government-prime interactions**
A. Contracting/program arrangement
B. Overly stringent specifications
5 Program-program interactions**
A. Design baseline shift in a predecessor program
B. Program reprioritization
6 Funding reduction after program start**
7 Technology changes
A. Take advantage of advances in a certain area
B. React to unfeasibility/obsolescence
C. Change requirements to acknowledge capabilities/feasibility
8 Need to change documentation
A. Synchronize paperwork
B. Rescheduling tests
* These 2 categories correspond to "Requirements-related issues".
** These 3 categories correspond to "Program interaction".
Table 3-2: Framework used for categorizing causes of engineering changes
Requirements Definition Issues
This category captures engineering changes that can be linked to shortcomings in the
requirements generation/definition process, and is one of two causes that could be related to the
"requirements-related issues" listed above. Grady64 suggested that necessary design changes to
rectify failure to meet customer authenticated requirements "can be reduced by insisting on the
discipline that requirements be developed before design is accomplished and by making sure that
design personnel and teams are aware of and understand the requirements."' 65 Shortcomings of
the requirements generation process at the beginning of a program can sometimes be evident in
64 Grady, Jeffrey O. System Requirements Analysis. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993. pp.79-80.
the contractor-submitted ECP forms, or they can be inferred based on interviews with
government and contractor personnel familiar with the earlier phases of the program66
An engineering change may also be an unintended result of implementing a previous
engineering change. Grady67 noted that unintended consequences would result when
implementing an engineering change whose requirements are not adequately understood. Since
this phenomenon is related to the understanding of requirements before carrying out tasks, the
primary cause of an engineering change attributable to the implementation of a previous
engineering change would be placed in this category.
Changes in Needs
This category of causes, the second of the two which corresponded to the original
"Requirements-related issues" listed above, is intended to capture the contribution of changes in
user needs over time to engineering changes in a program. These changes in user needs may
include the necessity to respond to improved enemy capabilities 68, and/or additional needs that
did not exist at program initiation 69. Furthermore, the user community may already have
identified particular needs, but may have opted to learn more about the need before committing to
a subsystem design. For example, changes in training and support equipment requirements may
be due to this reason7 .
Need to Fix Deficiencies
This particular category accounts for engineering changes reflecting the fact that in the
development and production of complex systems, it is unrealistic to expect absolutely no
mistakes. Engineering changes implemented to correct mistakes that existed despite the




66 The observation is based on researcher's experiences in conducting the research.
67 Grady: 1993; p.80.
68 Grady: 1993, p. 8 0 .
69 Beam, Walter R. Systems Engineering: Architecture and Design. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1990. p. 11.
70 The example is based on observations made while collecting ECP data, and on interviews with contractor
personnel.
thoroughness of the requirements definition process and the degree of dedication of the personnel
are captured in this category.
Government-prime Interactions
This category addresses issues similar to those identified by Fricke et al.71 as
"Planning/management factors" and similar to the contractual arrangement issues alluded to in
MIL-STD-480B ECP Justification Codes72. One of the intentions of the research is to study the
contributions of government program management practices/decisions to engineering changes. In
some cases, the government may rely on a single prime contractor for development and
production phases of a program. In other cases, the government may choose to have a single
prime contractor during development, and multiple prime contractors during production. In yet
other cases, the government may choose to be the integrator during the development phase and
manage multiple prime contractors. A question of interest is whether and how such different
arrangements may drive the need for engineering changes.
Another issue related to the way the government interacts with its contractors is the
stringency of the contractually imposed specifications. For example, the government may dictate
how requirements are to be met, with any permanent deviation from a "how-to" requirement
requiring an ECP73. It would also be of interest to know the extent to which these how-to
specifications might drive the need for engineering changes.
71 Fricke, Ernst, Bernd Gebhard, et al. "No Innovation without Changes, but..." Proceedings of the Seventh Annual
International Symposium of the International Council on Systems Engineering, Vol. 1. August 3-7, 1997, Los
Angeles, CA. p.602.
72 MIL-STD-480B Section 5.1.3.
73 An interview with the configuration manager on Program A underscored the distinction between a deviation, a
waiver, and an ECP. Deviation is a temporary change from specifications during development, i.e., contractor will
return to following the contracted specifications. Waiver is permission to deliver items that deviate from
specifications, and contractor will repair the deviations later. ECP makes both permanent.
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Program-program Interactions
This category addresses organizational coordination issues similar to those identified by
Fricke et al.74 According to observations made while collecting ECP data, the SPO may be
responsible for a number of on-going acquisition programs that began at different times. When
the design of a subsystem in one acquisition program closely follows that of a subsystem in an
earlier program, the engineering changes in the earlier program may impact the later program.
Thus, how engineering changes in one program result in engineering changes in a subsequent
program is a question of interest to this research.
A System Program Office (SPO) is responsible for all programs and related assets (e.g.
test equipment) it manages. The SPO may occasionally reprioritize tasks across different
programs. When different programs share the same test assets, for example, reprioritization may
result in the higher-priority program making earlier use of the test assets. Since the test schedule
may be included as a contracted requirement, the temporarily lower-priority program may need
to make an engineering change to modify the test schedule 75 . How similar interactions drive the
need for engineering changes is yet another category of causes of engineering changes which is
important to understand, particularly since it may shed light on program management practices of
the government.
Funding Reduction after Program Start
Gansler76 has argued that a cut-back in military expenditures in a current year by reducing
funding for one program would not only affect that program in later years, but would also affect
other programs in the current and later years. It may become necessary for some of the affected
programs to. change their requirements in response to the funding reduction. These requirements
changes may be implemented via engineering changes. This category is another possible cause of
engineering changes relevant to this research.
74 Same as Footnote 71
75 Testing is part of verification, which is a systems engineering task.
Technological Change
The contribution of changes in technology to the need for engineering changes is also one
of the factors important to this research. Fricke et al. have named "Technical factors" as one of
the three broad causal categories for the purpose of classifying the causes of engineering changes.
The data collection effort for this research has indicated at least three ways in which
engineering changes may come about because of technological changes. First, the contractor or
the customer, which could be the user community or the acquisition community, may choose to
incorporate a more recent technology into a design or an existing product for a variety of reasons
including cost savings, increased performance, or ease of manufacturing. Second, there may be no
choice but to incorporate a more recent technology because the various subsystems, components,
and test equipment embodying older technology have become obsolete, or would be prohibitively
expensive to acquire and sustain. Third, the customer, faced with the prohibitively high temporal
and monetary costs of reaching the original performance expectation, may modify requirements
to accept a smaller, more realistic, performance improvement.
Need to Change Documentation
Adopted from Code A of MIL-STD-480B ECP Justification Codes, this causal category
accounts for engineering changes directly due to the need to coordinate documentation.
Furthermore, the need for engineering changes due to any rescheduling action in the case-study
programs, except for those that can be substantiated as being due to program reprioritization,
would be placed in this category, especially when such engineering changes cannot be attributed
to another cause.
76 Gansler, Jacques S. Affording Defense. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991. pp. 10 2 -10 3 .
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3.3.2 Evaluation of the Framework for Categorizing Causes of Engineering Changes
An evaluation of the framework for categorizing causes of engineering changes was done
according to the three criteria developed in Section 2.5. The following paragraphs describe the
results of this evaluation.
Examine a Variety of Product Development Issues
The framework meets this criterion for two reasons. First, the framework is not limited
to the design-manufacturing interface. Second, the framework explicitly enables the study of how
various product development practices of both the government program office and the
contractors might contribute to engineering changes.
Provide a Systems View of US Defense Aerospace Product Development
This criterion is met because the framework studies the roles of, and interactions among,
the various communities in defense aerospace product development as possible contributors of
engineering changes. For example, the framework studies the extent to which changes in user
needs might contribute to the engineering changes on a program. Similarly, the framework also
studies the interactions among different communities - the program offices, the prime contractors,
and the different programs within the same SPO - as possible contributors of engineering changes.
Extract Lessons Learned
As in the case of the existing frameworks reviewed in Chapter 2, lessons learned can be
derived from analyses employing this framework, as long as corroborative data can be obtained.
This research seeks to identify product development practices that help to reduce certain
engineering changes. Therefore, the framework should be capable of relating the causes of
engineering changes to specific activities performed and decisions made during the development
of a product.
3.4 Framework for Categorizing Impacts of Engineering Changes
This section presents the framework employed in this research for categorizing the
impacts of engineering changes. The framework is largely based on the literature and practices
discussed in Section 2.6.
Since engineering changes differ in their scope of impact, the framework must permit an
examination of the impacts of engineering changes at an appropriate level of detail (or generality)
to enable cross-program comparison. For example, engineering changes during the early design
phase of a program would have no impact on the physical manifestation of the product since no
product would yet have been built in this phase. Also, an engineering change that calls for the
repair of certain components to be done by the user community would include detailed estimates
of labor hours required. The framework must provide meaningful cross-program comparisons in
the presence of such differences.
3.4.1 The Framework for Categorizing Impacts of Engineering Changes
Table 3-3 shows the framework used in this research for categorizing the impact of
engineering changes. Notable features and each impact area, or domain, are explained below.
1 Near-term cost impact
* More cost with engineering change than without






3 Product performance with respect to expectation
* Increase
* Decrease
* Met shifted expectation with engineering change
* Met existing expectation with engineering change
* Not impacted










6 Impact on other program offices in SPO
* Yes
* No




Table 3-3: Framework used for categorizing impacts of engineering changes
A number of features of this framework are noted. First, the impact areas - cost,
schedule, and performance - largely address "things" 77 related to a program. Second, the prime
contractors, the suppliers, the user community, and the program office largely address the
"people" 78 aspects of the program. Third, since the program office responsible for processing an
engineering change always does more work, as observed during on-site data collection at the SPO,
tracking how that program office is impacted would not be very illuminating. Therefore,
"impacts on program office's work" is not among the impact areas studied. However, it would
be illuminating to study how an engineering change might impact other program offices in the
same SPO, and this impact area is included. Finally, the user community is not studied
separately because it is closely coupled with the performance of the product, and interviews with
the user community were not possible within the confines of the research.
The impact areas are discussed below. The examples given in each discussion are based
on ECP descriptive data collected for this research.
Near-term Cost Impact
This impact area captures the effects of engineering changes on the cost variable. For the
purpose of this research, cost may be incurred by any party including the customer, the prime
contractor, or the suppliers (subcontractors). An engineering change can result in cost increases
borne by the customer in the near-term, but can result in future product life cycle cost savings.
Therefore, for the cost variable, because of uncertainty about future cost savings, the research
focuses on the near-term cost impacts of engineering changes. In this context, the research
attempts to answer the following question, "As a result of the engineering change, was the cost of
the program higher or lower than it otherwise would have been without the engineering change, or
was it not impacted at all?" For example, a redesign to meet requirements, although not paid for
by the customer, would translate directly into a cost increase for the contractor. The cost of the
77 The idea was suggested by a discussion on fundamentals of complexity in Flood, Robert L. & Ewart R. Carson.
Dealing with Complexity: An Introduction to the Theory and Application of Systems Science. New York, NY:
Plenum Press. 1993. p.2 4 .
Flood & Carson: 1993, p. 2 4 .
program, therefore, would likely be higher. Alternatively, an engineering change made to modify
the requirements, terminate design activities, and accept obtainable capability would likely make
the program cost less than it otherwise would have without the engineering change.
It should also be noted that the only cost figure reported on the ECP submittal form is the
cost to government. The existence of any additional cost to contractor, such as in the case where
the contractor must correct a product defect, can only be inferred from descriptions of the
engineering change.
Program Schedule
This impact area addresses the overall program schedule, rather than the schedules of
individual tasks in a program. In the course of the research, specific cases have been encountered
where additional tasks could be performed without jeopardizing program schedule. It needs to be
clearly understood that this impact area, focusing on impacts of engineering changes on program
schedule, does not address the broader and different question, "What are all the sources of
program schedule delays?"
Product Performance with respect to Expectations
This impact area bridges the "things" and "people" aspects of a program because the user
community (people) is very closely associated with the performance of the product (thing). The
increase in product performance beyond expectations addresses the "delight the customer" 79
aspect of product development. An example of decrease in product performance with respect to
expectations would be engineering change made to accept an achievable product performance that
is lower than originally expected or specified. Engineering changes can also be made to meet
shifting expectation. For example, new training equipment may be added to the overall system
design to address new training needs that may not have been anticipated earlier. Furthermore,
engineering changes can also be made to meet existing expectations. Fixing a deficiency would be
79 "Delight the customer" is a concept about doing a little extra for the customer. The concept is discussed by
Boppe, Charles W. in MIT course 16.870 Aerospace Product Design. Fall 1996.
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such an example. Finally, engineering changes may not necessarily impact product performance,
such as in the case of engineering changes made to documentation so that the documentation
would match the actual design.
Primary Impact on Prime Contractor's Work
This impact area studies whether the prime contractor must do rework, more work
(expanded contract scope), or less work (a relief from some contracted requirements) as a result
of an engineering change. Rework may correct something that was not done correctly before. It
would encompass redesigns and documentation coordination. New work is something the
contractor was not required to do prior to the engineering change. An example would be to
produce new training simulators in order to meet evolved user requirements. An example of an
engineering change resulting in the prime contractor having to do less work would result from
modifying requirements to accept realistically obtainable capabilities. In such a case, the
engineering change would relief the prime contractor from having to carry out more design tasks
necessary to meet the original requirements.
Primary Impact on Supplier(s)' Work
This impact area studies whether the suppliers must do rework, more work (expanded
contract scope), or less work as a result of an engineering change. The definitions of the types of
impact (i.e. rework, new work, and less work) are the same as those stated in the impact area
addressing the effects of engineering changes on the prime contractor's work.
Impact on Other Programs
In Table 3-2, one of the hypothesized causes of engineering changes was the interactions
among programs under the SPO. This impact area explores a similar issue of whether each
engineering change from one program has impacted another program under the SPO in any way.
Unanticipated Engineering Changes in the Same Program
This impact area intends to quantify the extent to which engineering changes
subsequently lead to additional unanticipated engineering changes. Whether an engineering change
was an unanticipated result of a previous engineering change can be determined from the
description of the engineering change, supplemented by government and contractor documents
and interview results. This impact area reflects "cause-effect net of changes" concept that has
been advanced by Fricke et al.80
3.4.2 Evaluation of the Framework for Categorizing Impacts of Engineering Changes
All three criteria used in Section 3.3.2 to evaluate the framework for categorizing causes of
engineering changes can be applied to evaluate the framework for categorizing impacts of
engineering changes.
Examine a Variety ofProduct Development Issues
The proposed framework is fairly general and is not limited to the design-manufacturing
interface, which has been the primary focus of previous studies on engineering changes. The
impact areas have been broadly defined so as not to stipulate the life cycle phase or
organizational interface to which the framework may be applied.
Provide a Systems View of US Defense Aerospace Product Development
The framework accounts for the impacts on the products and the communities involved in
defense aerospace product development. Although the impact on the work of each program
office is not explicitly addressed (because its work always increases with each engineering change,
as observed during the on-site research at the SPO), the impacts on the acquisition community
are examined via the impact of an engineering change on other programs, and whether an
engineering change led to additional unanticipated engineering changes.
80 Fricke et al.: 1997, p. 60 1.
Extract Lessons Learned
The framework satisfies this criterion by having the potential to show how the impacts of
engineering changes may vary from program to program. The differences would have to be
explained using program-level data. For example, it is possible that one program had a
significantly higher percentage of engineering changes associated with program schedule delay
than did the other two programs, the difference must be explained using knowledge about the
programs, thereby inferring lessons learned about product development.
3.5 Data Analysis and Interpretation Process
Efficacy of the findings of this research depends in large part on consistency in
identifying the primary cause and impacts of each of the 118 engineering changes across the three
case-study programs. Uniform analysis of the data according to the frameworks presented in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 was the mechanism for assuring consistency. This section focuses on how
causes and impacts of engineering changes are determined, and on how the major conclusions are
drawn from consistent analysis of quantitative data and program descriptions.
3.5.1 Identifying and Coding the Causes of Engineering Changes
For the purpose of data analysis in this research, the framework presented in Table 3-2
provides a set of bins into which each of the 118 engineering changes can be placed. The most
important cause of each engineering change was identified based on written and verbal inputs
from the pertinent ECP documents, the government program office, and the contractors. The
inputs were first recorded in one row (one row for each engineering change) in an appropriate
EXCEL file (one file for each program), and then the primary cause was determined and coded
according to Table 3-2. The rationale for the determination was recorded at the end of the row,
along with any other remarks. This process was repeated for all 118 engineering changes. The
percentage of engineering changes due to each cause was then computed.
Several difficulties were encountered while implementing this procedure. Sometimes the
program office and the contractor provided conflicting explanations of why an engineering change
was necessary. In these cases, the determination relied as much as possible on documented
records. Also, there were cases when two causes seem equally plausible based on the weight of
the available evidence. In such cases, the primary cause was judged to have been the one that was
more likely to have been present earlier in time, to the extent that this judgement was supported
by data. In addition, there were cases in which it was difficult to distinguish between an
engineering change that was due primarily to changes in user needs and another engineering change
that was due primarily to changes in technology. However, this ambiguity could usually be
resolved by a close examination of the documented data. If it could be determined that the
engineering change addressed a user need by incorporating newer technology, then the change was
attributed to changes in user need. On the other hand, before an engineering change could be
ascribed to changes in technology, data was required to indicate that a certain party in the
product development process (e.g., customer, prime contractor) actively sought out the newer
technology. Another problem occurred when two prime contractors each submitted an ECP8 l to
address an issue that pertained to both of them. In such cases, it was necessary to determine
which ECP would not have been filed had it not been for the dual-prime contractual arrangement.
The one that must be filed because of the dual-prime arrangement was coded as having been due
to "government-prime interactions." The other engineering change was treated as if it were the
only engineering change addressing the issue. Finally, an engineering change file alone was
sometimes insufficient to justify a determination of the primary cause. In such cases it was
necessary to rely on the interview results.
3.5.2 Identifying and Coding the Impacts of Engineering Changes
The data coding process for impacts of engineering changes was similar to that for the
causes of engineering changes. However, one difference was that an engineering change could
affect all seven impact areas identified in Table 3-3, whereas each engineering change could be
ascribed to only one primary cause. Therefore, it was necessary to examine each engineering
change seven times, once for each of the seven impact areas, to look for evidence - from ECP
8' They are supposed to do this if the specifications under their control are affected by the engineering change.
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submission, and written and verbal inputs from the government and contractors - that may
indicate how each area might have been impacted. For each engineering change recorded in a row
in an EXCEL file, every cell in that row was given a justification as to why each specific impact
was identified and coded.
The degree of difficulty in identifying and coding the impacts of engineering changes
varied according to the impact area in question. For example, it was relatively straightforward to
determine whether an engineering change from one program impacted another program. On the
other hand, it was more difficult to determine the impacts of engineering changes on product
performance with respect to expectations because of the subjective nature of such impacts.
3.5.3 The Development of Lessons Learned
Graphical representations of data regarding the causes and impacts of engineering changes
on the three case-study programs enabled the development of lessons learned in two ways. First
the trends in the graphical representations of engineering change data from each case-study
program, combined with pertinent descriptive data, provided insights about certain aspects of
that program. Second, the graphical representations of the engineering change data collected for
this research, combined with descriptive data about the three programs, enabled cross-program
comparisons that led to some insights that may be applicable to broader aspects of defense
aerospace product development.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided the background information on the implementation of the research
in order to enable the reader to understand and judge the findings that follow in subsequent
chapters. It has provided the fundamentals of the case study research that included the data
sources, and the characteristics of the elements of the database. Next, it introduced the
frameworks for categorizing causes and impacts of engineering changes that were used for
translating text-based data into quantitative data. Finally, the chapter outlined the process via
which the translation was implemented and the findings were developed.
It should be stressed that the database and the findings presented below pertain to three
specific case-study programs. Therefore, generalizations from the results of this analysis to the
entire US defense aerospace industry should be carefully qualified.
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4. Program Characteristics and Causes of Engineering Changes
This chapter describes the case studies performed in the research, with the goal of
enabling an understanding of the relationships between program characteristics and the causes of
engineering changes. Section 4.1 provides basic program data such as cost, schedule, and level of
specifications controlled by the customer during development phase. Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4
relate program characteristics to causes of engineering changes. Section 4.5 presents various
causes of engineering changes, aggregated across the three programs, in order to identify the
dominant causes. Finally, Section 4.6 summarizes the findings.
The framework used in this research for categorizing causes of engineering changes is
referred to extensively for detailed explanation of the data presented below. Therefore, Table 3-2
is repeated here for the convenience of the reader.
1 Requirements definition issues
A. Traceable to program initiation
B. Traceable to a previous change
2 Changes in needs
A. New needs identified
B. Needs definitized
3 Need to fix deficiencies
A. Modify design or product
4 Government-prime interactions
A. Contracting/program arrangement
B. Overly stringent specifications
5 Program-program interactions
A. Baseline shift in a predecessor program
B. Program reprioritization
6 Funding reduction after program start
7 Technology changes
A. Take advantage of advances in a certain area
B. React to unfeasibility/obsolescence
C. Change requirements to accept capabilities/feasibility
8 Need to change documentation
A. Synchronize paperwork
B. Reschedule tests
Table 4-1: Framework used for categorizing causes of engineering changes
Three cautionary remarks are appropriate at this point. First, the temptation to judge the
programs' technical and programmatic performance beyond the data shown in this research
should be resisted. This research is not intended to provide a comprehensive review or critique
of the programs. Second, the temptation to extrapolate the findings to other programs or sectors
of the defense aerospace industry should also be resisted. It is important to recall that all three
case-study programs are aircraft programs in electronics sector of the aerospace industry, so
generalizations beyond that sector should be viewed with caution. Finally, there is no one-to-one
correlation between Programs A, B, and C, and Contractors X, Y, and Z. In other words,
Contractor X cannot be assumed to be the sole prime contractor responsible for Program A.
The quantitative data presented below are based on ECP files, supporting documents, and
interviews with government and contractor personnel. The following sections represent the
researcher's understanding of the various details of the three programs, and the responsibility for
any error in interpretation rests fully with the researcher.
4.1 Program Parameters
Table 4-2 summarizes the cost-to-customer, program duration, and levels of
specifications controlled by the customer for each program's development phase. These three
items are explained in turn.
Nominal Additional Nominal Estimated Program Levels of specifications
development & customer development actual duration as controlled by customer
production cost expenses for time (Months) development of mid during development phase




Program A $280' $2544 36' 8410 14413 All16
Program B $6642 $935 508 84" 1164 All 17
Program C $12403 $816 579 5712 6615 System Specification (SS) &
Mission System
Specification (MSS) only' 8
(2 top-level specifications)
1 Program A internal presentation & original contract (development & production) cover sheets.
2 Development & production contracts cover sheets.
3 The estimate is based on figures published in applicable documents.
4 ECP data entries.
5 ECP data entries.
6 ECP data entries
7 Program A contractor memorandum.
8 Contractor Z personnel input.
9 Program calendar up to the delivery of first aircraft.
10 Effective date of production contract used as the end of full-scale development (FSD).
11 Effective date of production contract used as the end of FSD.
12 Same as Note 9, plus program office input that there has been no delay.
13 From effective date of FSD contract to the mid-March 1999.
14 From effective date of FSD contract to the mid-March 1999.
15 From date of contract of Program C studied until March 1999.
16 Program office & contractor personnel input.
17 Program office & contractor personnel input.
18 Program office & contractor personnel input.
Table 4-2: Basic program parameters
The cost data in Table 4-2 include only cost to the customer. They exclude, for example,
uncompensated contractor cost for implementing an engineering change. In addition, the user
community can issue contracts of limited dollar amounts82 without program office approval; and
the exact dollar amounts of these contracts are also excluded due to data unavailability.
Development, as opposed to production, schedules are of interest because the research
seeks to understand the relationship between product development and the need for engineering
changes. A special note on schedule pertains to the parallel nature of tasks. For example, a task
may need to be redone by implementing an engineering change, but this does not mean that every
such change would delay the entire program.
Since the last column in Table 4-2 is particularly important for understanding program
comparisons based on quantitative results, the terms "system specification (SS)" and "mission
system specification (MSS)" warrant some discussion83. The term "system specification"
usually refers to design documents describing the high-level functional and performance
characteristics of an overall product developed to carry out and support a mission. The "mission
system specification" usually refers to design documents describing the functional and
performance characteristics of only the elements of the overall product that actually carry out the
mission. At levels lower than the MSS, there are specifications that describe each of these
elements and their components. In the three case-study programs, since engineering changes in
Program C that were relevant only to lower-level specifications were unavailable, the exclusion of
engineering changes in Programs A and B that were relevant only to lower-level specifications is
necessary as a normalization step to ensure the comparability of results across all three
programs.
In the following sections the three programs are examined individually, before the results
are aggregated across all three programs.
82 Done via Engineering Services Task (EST) contracts.
83 The definitions of terms are based on Samaras & Czerwinski. Fundamentals of Configuration Management. New
York, NY: Wiley Interscience. 1973, pp.53-57, and Blanchard, Benjamin S. System Engineering Management. New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1991, pp. 6 5-6 7 .
4.2 Program A
4.2.1 Purpose and Scope
Program A was an upgrade program to integrate84 four electronics mission subsystems
into an existing fleet of mission aircraft, each of which carries a suite of mission subsystems. The
program would enhance the existing fleet by improving the aircraft's target
detection/identification, data processing, communications, and navigation capabilities.
4.2.2 Top-Level Description of Products
One of the four subsystems - designated as Subsystem Al - was the target
detection/identification system. Its design was based on an existing, technologically advanced
device in service with another branch of the US armed forces. In that application, the device is
operated in a stationary environment, but when integrated into Program A's aircraft, it was to
operate from moving aircraft. Despite this and other differences in operational characteristics,
the subsystem was thought to be 85% to 90% off-the-shelf (OTS) at the time Program A began.
According to interviewed sources from multiple organizations and backgrounds, the subsystem
today is considered to be 10% to 15% off-the-shelf and 85% to 90% developmental. The
difference between the expected and actual development required on Subsystem Al had
significant implications for its manufacturer, a supplier to Contractor Z.
The second of the four electronics mission subsystems - Subsystem A2 - was a low-risk
developmental item used for data processing. It was an upgrade of a subsystem in service on
Program A's aircraft. With the upgrade, Subsystem A2 gained processing speed and capacity.
During the course of Program A, a Subsystem A2 component, which interfaces with other
informational subsystems on the aircraft, went through yet another upgrade. This last increment
of upgrade made Subsystem A2 into an upgrade of an upgrade. The integration of Subsystem A2
into the aircraft was characterized as smooth, compared to that of Subsystem Al.
84 Any "development" in this program could be thought of as the development of the subsystem to be integrated,
and the way the integration was to be done.
Subsystem A3 was purchased by the customer, and turned over to Program A's prime
contractor to integrate into the aircraft. It was a communications subsystem capable of securely
sending and receiving data between a number of data senders and recipients. Similar to
Subsystem A2, the integration of Subsystem A3 into the aircraft could also be characterized as
smooth.
Finally, Subsystem A4 was added to provide navigation-related functions. Subsystem
A4 was also purchased by the customer, and turned over to Program A's prime contractor to
integrate into the aircraft. In addition to Program A's aircraft, Subsystem A4 was being added to
a number of different fleets of aircraft serving many different needs. Similar to Subsystem A2,
Subsystem A4 went through another upgrade during the course of Program A to increase its
capabilities. Similar to Subsystems A2 and A3, the integration of this subsystem into the aircraft
was also relatively trouble-free.
4.2.3 Product Development Process and Issues
The development phase of Program A began when concepts such as concurrent
engineering (CE) and integrated product and process development (IPPD) were not used in the
defense aircraft sector of the aerospace industry. The developmental work was done by a single
prime contractor, Contractor Z, which had the responsibility for selecting suppliers to the
program.
The suppliers of all the subsystems were deeply involved with the design of their
respective subsystems (i.e., they were manufacturing products of their own designs, not those of
the prime contractor's designs). Subsystems A3 and A4 were developed previously for other
programs. Their "suppliers" were so called because the products were being integrated into
Program A's aircraft, not because these companies were sub-contractors to Contractor Z.
For Subsystem Al, the supplier was the designer and producer of a device performing a
similar mission in another military branch. In order for Subsystem Al to perform as expected in
an operational environment for which the original version was not designed, it was necessary to
significantly redesign the off-the-shelf original. As Program A proceeded, the Subsystem Al
supplier became overwhelmed by the massive development effort required. Eventually,
Contractor Z became very active in monitoring the design and verification processes of the
supplier.
For Subsystem A2, the supplier (during development) was the original developer and
manufacturer of Subsystem A2's predecessor. When Subsystem A2 entered its production
phase, Contractor Y became another prime contractor on the program, and was responsible for
selling the subsystem directly to the government (represented by the program office). The
government in turn provided the subsystem to Contractor Z to integrate85 into the Program A
aircraft. There were, thus, two prime contractors in Program A, Contractor Y and Contractor Z.
With two prime contractors, Contractor Y and Contractor Z, during the production phase of
Program A, the changes in Contractor Y's Subsystem A2 product configurations could impact
higher-level specifications, contractually under the custody of Contractor Z. When such a
situation arose, each contractor had to submit an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to the
program office. Therefore, two ECPs were necessary to deal with one engineering change issue.
This situation in fact arose a small number of times in Program A.
4.2.4 Program A Causes of Engineering Changes
The results of the analysis showing the percentage composition of Program A engineering
changes due to each primary cause are shown in Figure 4-1. These results can be further
decomposed in two ways: the first is to decompose them into the causal subcategories shown in
Table 4-1 and the second is to decompose them according to the four Program A subsystems.
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Figure 4-1: Primary causes of engineering changes in Program A
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Figure 4-2: Breakdown of primary causes of engineering changes in Program A
Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 show that in Program A, the majority (68.3%) of engineering
changes were due primarily to three causes: requirements definition issues at the beginning of the
program, physical modifications made to fix deficiencies, and changes to take advantage of
advances in technology. In Figure 4-2, it can be seen from the bar for requirements definition
issues that only 3.3% of Program A engineering changes were due primarily to surprises resulting
from previous engineering changes. This small proportion of engineering changes correspond to
subcategory 1B in Table 4-1. In addition, nearly one-quarter of Program A engineering changes
were due primarily to the need to fix unforseeable deficiencies. Furthermore, while most of the
technology-related engineering changes shown in Figure 4-2 were made to take advantage of
newer technology, a minority of them (accounting for 1.7% overall) were made in response to
technological obsolescence, and a slightly larger minority (accounting for 3.3% overall) were made
to accept obtainable capabilities by modifying requirements. These correspond to subcategories
7A, 7B and 7C, respectively, in Table 4-1.
In addition, engineering changes that addressed changes in needs were due to foreign allies
joining the development program, user community requests that had never surfaced before, and
the modification of overall system configuration with updated simulators 86. These primary
causes correspond to causal subcategories 2A and 2B in Table 4-1.
The primary causes that are led to lesser percentages of engineering changes should also
be discussed. Under government-prime interactions in Figure 4-2, 5% of engineering changes
were due primarily to the fact that some Subsystem A2 changes during production required two
ECPs, one from each of Contractor Y and Contractor Z. Without the dual-prime arrangement,
only one engineering change would have been submitted by the prime contractor. Since there was
a dual-prime arrangement during the production phase of Subsystem A2, two engineering changes
were necessary when a change affected the specifications under the custody of each prime
contractor. The rest of the engineering changes due primarily to government-prime interactions
were made to relax some how-to specifications (subcategory 4B in Table 4-1). The single (1.7%)
engineering change in Program A due primarily to program-to-program interactions was a change
in system test schedule in order for a higher-priority test (from another program within the same
System Program Office) to make earlier use of test resources. Finally, 8.3% of engineering
changes in Program A were needed simply to match documentation describing the design with the
actual design.
86 Updated simulators were necessary so that operators can be trained to operate the new mission subsystems. The
purchases of such equipment required engineering changes because the presence of the updated simulators modified
the overall system that includes the aircraft, the mission subsystems, the operators, and the ground/support/training
equipment.
If engineering changes represented in Figure 4-1 were to be decomposed into those
pertaining and those not pertaining to Subsystem Al, it becomes clear in Figure 4-3 that
Subsystem Al, which was one of four Program A subsystems, accounted for 50% of the total
number of engineering changes in Program A. Figure 4-4 examines the primary causes of
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Figure 4-3: Dominance of Subsystem Al in terms of Program A engineering changes
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Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show that Subsystem Al accounted for high proportions of
Program A engineering changes that were due primarily to requirements definition issues and the
need to fix deficiencies. The former was traceable to the redesigns - actual redesigns of the
product and revisions of portions of design documents to more correctly reflect user needs -
carried out to modify the off-the-shelf system. The engineering changes that fixed deficiencies
were implemented to correct recent producibility and reliability problems on Subsystem Al.
Examples of these problems included cracked wire insulation, performance degradation due to
reversed capacitor polarity in installation, and unlabeled cables.
4.2.5 Discussion
Several observations can be made based on the case study. First, despite the early
involvement of the supplier of Subsystem Al in Program A's development phase, there remained
a large number of engineering changes that were implemented to adapt Subsystem Al's
predecessor to a different, and much more demanding operational environment than the one for
which it was originally designed. Second, the case study demonstrated the importance of
understanding the operational environment requirements when it comes to the adaptation of off-
the-shelf subsystems. Figure 4-3 shows that in terms of engineering changes, assuming a
subsystem to be mostly off-the-shelf can lead to redesigns sufficiently substantial to dominate a
program's efforts. Finally, it is observed that the combination of dominant causes of engineering
changes in Program A reflected the program's particular characteristics.
4.3 Program B
4.3.1 Purpose and Scope
The .purpose of Program B was to develop and integrate technology to increase the
performance of a key electronics mission subsystem (Subsystem B 1) on the aircraft. The
program combined a number of smaller programs into one to enhance data acquisition capability,
data processing speed and capacity, and human-machine interface. Also, although Subsystem B 1
was extensively modified, some parts of it were to be left unmodified. Program B personnel
interviewed at multiple organizations for the purposes of this research have noted that the
program had significant software content.
4.3.2 Top-Level Description of Products
The main achievement of Program B was the increased performance of Subsystem B l,
accomplished via the installation of an improvement kit. Elements of the improvement kit
addressed the data acquisition capability, data processing speed and capacity, and human-
machine interface aspects of the subsystem. Hardware aspects of data acquisition enhancement
were accomplished by replacing older components with those of tighter tolerances and lower
electronic noise. Data processing was improved with an all-new, larger and faster computer.
Finally, the man-machine interface was improved by a totally-new operator's console, complete
with dual displays. The improvement kit also included corresponding software updates. With
the improvement kit installed, the subsystem would consist of some original components, some
slightly updated components, and some all-new, state-of-the-art components.
4.3.3 Product Development Process and Issues
The study of Program B focused on full-scale development (FSD) and production phases.
Several notable Program B product development issues include the way the program office
interacted with the contractors during FSD, integration of key suppliers into product
development, and the dependence of Program B's progress on that of Program A.
The customer, as opposed to a prime contractor, was the integrator during FSD, with two
contractors serving as associate contractors. The goal of this contractual arrangement by the
program office was to reduce cost; the program office did not have to pay one prime contractor
to manage another as a supplier. The associate contractors were equal primes, although one
contractor, Contractor Z, was responsible for meeting system level specifications8 7 , while the
other, Contractor X, was responsible for meeting specifications up to a prime item 88 specification
covering Subsystem B1. For Contractor X, the prime item specification was the "system-
"7 Those denoted as System Specification (SS), and Mission System Specification (MSS).
level" 89 specification. In terms of product architecture, Contractor X's product was to become
part of Contractor Z's product. It must be emphasized that this situation is fundamentally
different from one in which a development program uses two prime contractors to design
equivalent but competing products with the goal of eventually downselecting to just one prime
contractor.
An immediate consequence of the associate contractor arrangement was that when an
engineering change affected specifications traceable to both contractors, each contractor had to
submit an ECP addressing its portion of the change. This arrangement may have led to
disconnects in requirements, especially during the development phase, when one contractor's
product had to be installed into another contractor's product, with the customer assumed the
task of integrating the products. Contractors X and Z, and the program office personnel met
monthly at program management reviews (PMRs). During Program B's production phase, the
production contract called for one prime contractor, and one of the two associate contractors in
FSD became the key supplier to the prime contractor.
A prime-supplier relationship between the two contractors could still exist in substance,
although not in name, since the early development phase, even though both were associate
contractors in the strictly contractual sense. One way to consider the situation is to consider the
relationship between the products of the contractors. When the product of one contractor
becomes a part of the product of another, the former contractor could be considered a supplier.
In the case of Program B, Contractor X could be considered a supplier to Contractor Z even
though they were associate contractors during FSD. In this case, the key supplier and some of
its lower-tier suppliers were involved in Program B development early on.
Finally, the third product development issue identified in Program B was the fact that the
progress of Program B depended somewhat on that of Program A, since subsystems from both
programs were onboard the same fleet of aircraft. The implication is that many changes in
88 One level below MSS.
89 The highest level for that associate contractor.
Program A could shift the design baselines of Program B. In this case, Program B would then
introduce engineering changes to accommodate the shifts in design baselines.
4.3.4 Patterns of Engineering Changes
Figure 4-5 shows the distribution of engineering changes in Program B in terms of their
primary causes. It is clear that most of the engineering changes in Program B were due primarily
to requirements definition issues, government-prime interactions, program-program interactions,
and technological changes. Figure 4-6 shows the breakdown of the primary causes into the causal
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Figure 4-6: Breakdown of primary causes of engineering changes in Program B
Just as in Program A, the combination of dominant causes of engineering changes in
Program B can be explained in terms of the program's characteristics. First, despite frequent
contacts among the two associate contractors and the customer during full-scale development,
engineering changes due primarily to requirements definition issues remained. In particular, some
of these engineering changes involved the need to clarify a disagreement between the parties on
how to measure two fundamental performance parameters of the all-new Subsystem B1
computer. In addition, there were numerous rewrites on Subsystem B 1 test procedures. Second,
19.4% of Program B's engineering changes were due to the customer-mandated associate
contractor arrangement. Since some changes affected specifications for which both contractors
were responsible, both contractors had to introduce the necessary engineering changes. In a
single-prime arrangement, normally only one engineering change would be submitted for a
particular change issue. Therefore, one of each pair of such engineering changes was the result of
the associate contractor arrangement required by the customer. As shown in Figure 4-6, very few
of the engineering changes in Program B were due primarily to surprises created by previous
engineering changes (subcategory 1B in Table 4-1), or to overly stringent specifications
(subcategory 4B in Table 4-1). Third, another 19.4% of the engineering changes in Program B
were due primarily to changes in Program A (i.e., program-to-program interactions). Finally,
since Program B was basically a technology development program, it may not be surprising that
the technological changes, in the aggregate, represented a significant cause. According to Figure 4-
6, technology-related engineering changes were made in equal proportions to take advantage of
newer technology90 , to deal with diminished manufacturing sources 91, and to modify requirements
to accept capability 92 achievable in a technology development program. These causal
subcategories have been outlined as 7A, 7B, and 7C, respectively, in Table 4-1.
The less dominant causes should also be explained. The single engineering change due
primarily to changes in needs, accounting for 3.2% of all engineering changes in Program B
resulted from the need to relocate a piece of safety equipment so that operators of relatively
small physical stature could reach it. This was considered a change in user need, since at the time
the improvement kit for Subsystem B 1 was originally developed, there were no operators of such
small physical stature. However, by the time the improvement kit was installed and tested, there
were operators with sufficiently small physical stature who could not reach the safety
equipment. One of the engineering changes made to fix deficiencies was a software rewrite to
remove a discovered safety hazard. The others were aimed at fixing a newly developed display
that did not perform as expected. The solution was to use a different display that required
significant redesign of its cabinet and cooling. Finally, documentation changes were those made
to ensure that design documentation were in order, and to consolidate two flight tests into one.
4.3.5 Discussion
Several observations about the Program B case study should be made. These include
early supplier integration into product development, the use of associate contractor arrangement
in full-scale development, and the dependence on Programs A. These observations are in addition
to the one which indicated that Program B's combination of dominant causes of engineering
changes depended on characteristics of Program B.
90 An example would be the weight-saving removal of a computer cabinet whose function was taken over by parts of
the new computer.
91 For example, the engineering change allowing the use of the newer version of an instrument attached to the
Subsystem B operator's console.
92 The capability increase in Program B required some unprecedented technologies, where "no one really knew the
answer." There is a point beyond which increased capability no longer justified the required effort to getting it.
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Despite the early involvement of the key supplier responsible for Subsystem B 1 in the
product development process, requirements definition issues remained as one of the dominant
causes of engineering changes in Program B. The engineering changes due primarily to
requirements definition issues pertained to redefining performance measures for the new
Subsystem B1 computer, and rewriting software test requirements.
The use of the associate contractor arrangement also warrants some discussion. On the
level most related to engineering changes, the use of the associate contractor arrangement during
full-scale development would necessitate two engineering changes to address one change issue if it
affected both associate contractors. Government and contractor personnel also pointed out that
in the development of a complex product such as Subsystem B1, the use of the associate
contractor arrangement increased the possibility of specifications managed by the contractors
going out of alignment. A special note about the associate contractor relationship pertains to the
applicability of the aforementioned observations to other programs. The observations do not in
any way address the merits of developmental programs in which multiple prime contractors
develop equivalent but competing products with the understanding that there will be an eventual
downselect to one prime contractor.
Finally, the observation that there were many engineering changes in Program B due to its
dependence on the progress of Program A should not imply that such dependence was either
good or bad. The data simply indicated that when programs closely follow one another, in the
sense that Program B had to follow Program A because both programs involved the same fleet of
aircraft, there could be many engineering changes on the follower program to incorporate relevant
engineering changes from the predecessor program.
4.4 Program C
4.4.1 Purpose and Scope
The purpose of Program C was to provide a new user community with capabilities
similar to those provided by Program A's aircraft prior to most of the upgrades introduced by
Program A. Program C was a production program with some up-front development effort to
ensure smooth integration of electronics mission subsystems into the aircraft. The user
community would receive the overall system that included the airframe, the electronics mission
subsystems, training facilities/equipment, and ground-based mission support facilities/equipment.
Timely delivery (i.e., schedule) was a priority on this program.
The program can be considered unprecedented for a number of reasons. First, the scale
and capabilities of the system would significantly enhance the capabilities of the new user
community. Second, the development and production of the mission aircraft represented a large
step for the prime contractor, because while the airframe and mission subsystems had already
existed separately, their exact integration into the mission aircraft posed an entirely new
challenge. Finally, the program adopted two new management practices: Clear Accountability in
Design (CAID), and integrated product and process development(IPPD) using integrated product
teams (IPTs). These two practices were also unprecedented in that they were used from the
beginning of Program C, while only IPTs have been used during the production phases of
Programs A and B.
4.4.2 Top-Level Description of Products
The Program C case-study included all aspects of the program except for the modification
of the airframe in preparation for the integration of electronics mission subsystems. The
portions of the program that fly away - the airframe plus electronics mission subsystems - would
perform missions identical to those performed by the fleet of aircraft in Programs A and B. The
mission subsystems were similar to those that had not yet received Programs A and B upgrades.
Another portion of Program C included training and support facilities because the mission
subsystems require trained operators, and the missions themselves need extensive preflight
preparation. Of all three case-study programs, Program C was the most comprehensive in that it
provided aircraft, mission subsystems, and training/support equipment.
The overall system was improved in two different ways under Program C. First, the
requirements regarding training and ground support facilities and equipment were definitized and
accommodated using engineering changes along the way during the program. Second, some
improvements based on mature technologies from another program under the same System
Program Office were selected and incorporated into Program C subsystems via engineering
changes.
4.4.3 Product Development Process and Issues
This section highlights a number of product development issues in Program C. They
include the use of CAID, the use of IPTs, and supplier integration into product development.
One of the new program management practices implemented in Program C was Clear
Accountability in Design (CAID). Under CAID, the single prime contractor of Program C was
responsible for developing and meeting lower level specifications (anything lower than mission
system specification). The customer controlled only system specification (SS) and mission
system specification (MSS) during development93 , and would take control of the lower level
specifications at a later date, such as after Functional Configuration Audit (FCA)/Physical
Configuration Audit (PCA)94. This means that engineering changes not affecting at least MSS
could be implemented by the prime contractor without program office approval. Therefore,
engineering changes in Program C affecting only lower level specifications were not directly
observable by the customer, while in Programs A and B, which did not implement CAID, such
changes could in fact be directly observed. Consequently, normalization according to levels of
specifications affected by engineering changes would be necessary when comparing engineering
change data across all three programs.
The prime contractor for Program C also employed integrated product teams (IPTs) for
each subsystem to be integrated into the aircraft from the beginning of the program. According to
interview data, use of IPTs enhanced the prime contractor's ability to properly define
requirements early in the program by ensuring that the requirements of the IPTs were properly
accounted for through systems engineering. Having properly defined the requirements included
not only knowing what had to be firmly defined early, but also what could be deferred until later.
93 For a comparison among programs in this regard, refer to Table 4-2.
94 Program C FCA/PCA had not occurred when the data collection effort for this research ended.
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4.4.4 Patterns of Engineering Changes
Figure 4-7 shows the relative importance of the primary causes of engineering changes on
Program C. The decomposition of the data into causal subcategories is shown in Figure 4-8. It is
apparent from Figure 4-7 that a high percentage of Program C engineering changes was due
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Figure 4-8: Breakdown of primary causes of engineering changes in Program C
Most of the engineering changes in Program C that were due primarily to changes in









support facilities/equipment (subcategory 2b in Table 4-1). The design of the overall system was
changed by the addition of these facilities and equipment. The single engineering change due
primarily to added requirement (subcategory 2a in Table 4-1) was one in which the customer
added certain flight tests to learn more about the possible interference between one electronics
mission subsystem and parts of the aircraft on which the subsystem was installed.
The engineering changes related to technological changes were implemented to take
advantage of more recent technological developments. Most of these newer technologies were
adopted from another program under the same SPO. A number of technology-related engineering
changes were introduced to make use of available flight test assets to replace those that were
difficult to obtain due to obsolescence.
Finally, the need to align documentation was another important cause of engineering
changes in Program C. Since the fleet of mission aircraft being acquired under Program C was
unprecedented, some engineering estimates were based on data from existing, similar aircraft.
After the Program C mission aircraft was produced, these estimates in specification documents
were replaced with data based on the actual Program C mission aircraft.
It is noted here that requirements definition issues turned out not to be a dominant cause
of engineering changes in Program C, accounting for only two engineering changes. One was made
to address a requirement that had remained unfulfilled since the beginning of the program, while
the other was made to correct documentation errors introduced, but not accounted for, when two
prior engineering changes had been implemented.
Additional engineering changes in Program C should also be explained. For instance, a
deficiency in a navigation subsystem was corrected by implementing the single engineering change
to fix the deficiency. Another engineering change was done to replace a customer-imposed
verification procedure for a certain piece of support equipment with one that was less rigorous.
This was accomplished because the support equipment had already been verified for use with
another aircraft. The engineering changes related to program-to-program interactions resulted
from a baseline shift in a Program C subsystem that was previously developed under another
program, and also from the realignment of some flight tests.
4.4.5 Discussion
The previous discussion in this chapter led to one general observation about the causes of
engineering changes in Program C. The combination of dominant causes of engineering changes in
Program C depended on the characteristics of Program C.
A main point that should also be underscored from this case study is that the use of IPTs
helped Program C to define many of its requirements early in the program. This provided the
opportunity later to readily improve the overall system by assessing and accommodating changes
in user needs (e.g. those pertaining to training and support facilities/equipment) as well as
changes in technology. One program representative has indicated that these engineering changes
have been incorporated quickly because they were innocuous and that the newer technologies
involved were mature and of low risk. On the other hand, integration problems had also been
encountered, as pointed out during another interview. The interview data suggested that mature
technologies should not be automatically consider as being low risk.
4.5 Primary Causes of Engineering Changes: Data Aggregation &
Normalization
A special note about the absence of "funding reduction after program start" as a primary
cause of engineering changes is provided here before further discussion of the results. This
possible cause is not explicitly shown in any of the figures in this thesis since none of the
engineering changes in the database could be linked to any funding reduction after program start.
This does not mean, however, that "funding reduction after program start" cannot be a cause of
engineering changes in other programs.
4.5.1 Combinations of Dominant Causes of Engineering Changes
Figure 4-9 shows the primary causes of engineering changes in all three programs. The
combination of dominant causes in each program (i.e., three tallest bars in the figure for each
program) is different across the three programs. The dependence of the difference on program
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Figure 4-9: Primary causes of engineering changes in each of the three programs
The data normalization processes warrant some discussion. As shown in Figure 4-10, the
qualitative comparison across the three programs for each primary cause remained largely
unchanged when the data were normalized by removing from Program A and B data the
engineering changes that affected only specifications lower than and not including the MSS level
in order to make consistent comparisons with the data from Program C. In addition, the
engineering change data were also normalized using data for only 3.5 years since the inception of
each program. This duration was chosen based on the shortest interval of data availability. Since
all three programs were at approximately the same phase when the research began, this latter
normalization was not considered as compelling as the former. Nevertheless, the results are given
in Appendix D. In effect, this latter normalization reduced the relative importance of one
primary cause (i.e., fix deficiencies), and increased the importance of another primary (i.e.
documentation changes) in Program A. Furthermore, it also reduced the relative importance of
one primary cause in Program B (i.e., changes in technology).
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Figure 4-10: Specification-normalized primary causes of engineering changes on each of
the three case-study programs
4.5.2 Dominant Causes of Engineering Changes Across 3 Programs
One more aggregation of the data on the causes of engineering changes across all three
programs identifies the dominant causes of engineering changes across the three programs. The
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Figure 4-11: Dominant causes of engineering changes across three programs
As shown in Figure 4-11, requirements definition issues, the need to fix deficiencies, and
technological changes were the top three dominant causes of engineering changes across Programs
A, B, and C. Changes in needs as another dominant cause was added as a result of normalization
of the comprehensive data by removing engineering changes that did not affect system
specification (SS) and/or mission system specification (MSS). The specification-normalized
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Figure 4-12: Specification-normalized dominant causes of engineering changes across 3
programs
A comparison of Figure 4-12 and Figure 4-11 shows that the need to fix deficiencies no
longer appears as one of the top three dominant causes. This was largely due to the fact that a
large number of the more recent engineering changes in Programs A and B did not impact the
system specification and/or the mission system specification. Instead, the data normalization
identified changes in needs as one of the three dominant causes across the three programs. Thus,
four dominant causes of engineering changes are identified (i.e., top three from Figure 4-12, and
the need to fix deficiencies from Figure 4-11).
4.6 Summary of Findings
This chapter has identified several findings based on the case studies. These findings
provided some answers to the key questions stated at the beginning of Chapter 3.
4.6.1 Causes of Engineering Changes
The research has identified four dominant causes of engineering changes (three using the
specification-normalized data, one added based on the comprehensive data set): requirements
definition issues, changes in needs, changes in technology, and the need to fix deficiencies.
However, the case studies and their engineering change data also demonstrated that the
characteristics of each program largely shaped the combination of dominant causes of engineering
changes in each program.
4.6.2 Use of Off-the-Shelf Subsystems
The Program A case study provided a lesson-learned about the use of off-the-shelf
subsystems. Subsystem Al was an advanced subsystem developed and produced for another
branch of the armed services. In this case, the assumption that it could be easily adopted, with
little modification, for operations in a significantly different environment led to substantial
redesigns of an off-the-shelf item. The implication is that the use of an off-the-shelf subsystem,
without a firm understanding of the operational environment that the subsystem must endure,
may lead to substantial redesigns, thereby eroding the possible benefits of using the off-the-shelf
subsystem in the first place.
4.6.3 Engineering Changes & the Integration of Key Suppliers into Product
Development
The data available from Programs A and B indicate that early involvement of key
suppliers in product development, by itself, would be insufficient to reduce the percentage of
engineering changes that were primarily due to requirements definition issues. This observation
will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 5.
4.6.4 Engineering Changes and the Use of IPTs
The use of IPTs by the prime contractor in Program C helped to clarify requirements as
much early in that program. The relative lack of engineering changes that were due primarily to
requirements definition issues gave rise to opportunities to quickly and effectively assess and
accommodate newly definitized user needs and to introduce incremental improvements in
technology. Figure 4-13 summarizes these results. Figure 4-14 shows that these results largely
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This chapter has begun to show findings resulting from the case studies based on the three
programs. It described the programs, and showed the relationship between program
characteristics and the causes of engineering changes on these programs. In addition, this chapter
identified four dominant causes of engineering changes across the three programs, and presented
some lessons learned about defense aerospace product development.
The next chapter will continue to discuss the findings of the research. It will focus on the
impacts of engineering changes.
5. Impacts of Engineering Changes
This chapter continues the discussion of engineering changes by examining their impacts.
The goals of the research described here are to understand the nature of these impacts and
provide some observations about their possible implications for the defense aerospace product
development process. The data presented are the result of translating descriptive data into
quantitative codes using the framework presented in Table 5-1, which is repeated here from
Section 3.4.1 for the convenience of the reader. The reader is also encouraged to refer to Section
3.4.1 for detailed discussion of the impact areas listed in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1: Framework for categorizing impacts of engineering changes
1 Near-term cost impact
* More cost with engineering change than without






3 Product performance with respect to expectation
* Increase
* Decrease
* Met shifted expectation with engineering change
* Met existing expectation with engineering change
* Not impacted










6 Impact on other programs in SPO
* Yes
* No
7 Additional, unanticipated engineering changes over the
same issue in the same program
* Yes
* No
Two cautionary remarks are appropriate at this time. First, the results provide
qualitative aspects of impacts, rather than quantitative measures. Second, the data and results
were limited in terms of their ability to answer detailed questions regarding the internal
operations of the prime contractors and suppliers.
Flood and Carson 95 point out that two basic elements of complexity are "things and
people." Cost, schedule, and product performance can be considered three "things" about the
case-study programs. Section 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 each deals with these "things" aspects of the
programs. The various communities involved with the systems being acquired by the programs
are the "people" aspects. Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 address the "people" aspects in terms of the
impacts of engineering changes on the prime contractor(s), supplier(s), and other members of the
acquisition community represented by other programs in the same System Program Office.
Finally, Section 5.7 examines whether engineering changes in the three case-study programs led to
surprises in the same programs, which had to be addressed by more engineering changes. This
impact area arguably pertains to both "things" and "people". Section 5.8 highlights the major
findings regarding the impacts of engineering changes, and Section 5.9 summarizes the chapter.
5.1 Near-term Cost Implications of Engineering Changes
Cost, in general, is one of the major "things" to consider in evaluating a defense
acquisition program. In the research reported here, all engineering changes tended to either
increase or decrease the near-term cost of the program. In other words, all engineering changes
impacted near-term cost of the programs. Figure 5-1 shows the result.
95 Flood, Robert L. and Ewart R. Carson. Dealing with Complexity: An Introduction to the Theory and Application
of Systems Science, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1993, pp.24- 2 5.
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Figure 5-1: Near-term cost implications of engineering changes
The left-hand-side bars in each cluster in Figure 5-1 show the percentages of engineering
changes in each program that led to higher cost involved in the program, than would have been the
case without the engineering changes. The near-term cost increases could mean additional cost to
the customer, such as in the case of changing the design of the overall system by acquiring
additional equipment. The near-term cost could also tend to be higher if a contractor must
conduct a redesign in order to meet requirements. In the latter case, the near-term cost increases
were not reported on the ECP submittals, but could be inferred from the descriptions
documented in the submittals or in other descriptive materials related to such engineering changes.
The right-hand-side bar in each cluster in Figure 5-1 shows that some engineering changes
on each program led to lower near-term cost involved in the program, than would have been the
case without those engineering changes. Typically, these reductions resulted from modifications
in requirements 96 to accept obtainable capabilities instead of redesigning to obtain further
incremental increases in capabilities. The latter would mean higher near-term cost for certain
parties involved in developing/producing the system. The reductions also represented a smaller
number of. engineering changes which served to remove overly stringent or redundant
requirements. Otherwise, complying with these requirements would likely have made the
product more expensive for the contractor to build.
96 Engineering changes can either change the design/product, the documentation describing the design/product, or
both the design/product and the documentation.
Two cautions about the preceding discussion should be given. First, readers should not
necessarily conclude that because most engineering changes tend to make a program more
expensive, that engineering changes are therefore necessarily undesirable. As noted before,
capabilities can be increased at a cost and users may decide to accept the cost so as to realize the
additional capability. Second, the results in Figure 5-1 also held when engineering changes
affecting only lower-level specifications were removed from the data set, as shown in Figure 5-2.
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Figure 5-2: Specification-normalized near-term cost impacts of engineering changes
Some data from ECP submittals were available to indicate the orders of magnitude of
additional customer expenses for having engineering changes made to the product's design. The
orders of magnitude of dollar figures from Programs A, B, and C are shown in Figure 5-3, Figure
5-4, and Figure 5-5. Data from Programs A and C demonstrate roughly bell-shaped distributions
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Figure 5-5: Program C cost-to-customer of engineering changes
5.2 Impacts of Engineering Changes on Program Schedule
Program schedule is another "thing" of concern on defense acquisition programs. Figure
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Figure 5-6: Impacts of engineering changes on program schedule
The most striking observation about the results in Figure 5-6 is that the vast majority of





















the existence of the configuration control process is considered. This process is used to evaluate
the impacts, including the impact on program schedule, of each engineering change.
The second interesting observation is that no engineering change in the data set resulted in
advancing the program schedule. One possible explanation is that the act of advancing the
schedule may lead to increased cost for certain parties, such as the contractors. Indeed, changing
the design in order to complete something faster would require studying the possible
modifications to the design, making an Advance Change Study Notice (ACSN) 97 to the customer,
and if the customer gives the go-ahead, conducting a full-scale study to propose the engineering
change. Different communities, potentially including the users, program office, the prime
contractor, and their suppliers, would be involved in this process 98. These activities and
interested parties represent potential sources of cost increase. In addition, every design change
may carry some risk of something going wrong. Therefore, changing the design in order to
achieve the goal of advancing the schedule may not achieve the goal in light of these potential
problems. Program schedule is related to the much larger topic of acquisition cycle time of
defense aerospace systems. More research and data about US defense acquisition cycle time in
general can be found in the dissertation by McNutt 99.
It is useful to further explore the nature of engineering changes resulting in program
schedule delays in Programs A and B. Engineering changes resulting in program schedule delays
most often involved redesigns, as evidenced by both a review of the engineering change database
maintained for this research, and interviews with customer and contractor personnel. In some
cases the lengths of delay were identifiable from the documents, while in other cases they were
not. The capabilities obtainable from these redesigns were critical enough to the customers that
they decided to "buy", with some program schedule delay.
Another observation that can be made based on data presented in Figure 5-6 is that no
engineering changes in Program C resulted in schedule delays for that program. Indeed, according
97 An ACSN is like a preliminary ECP.
98 The discussion is based on observations made while collecting data at the System Program Office.
99 McNutt, Ross T. Reducing DoD Product Development Time: The Role of the Schedule Development Process.
MIT Doctoral Dissertation. December 1998.
to data summarized in Table 4-2, Program C schedule did not slip at all. This result appears to
be nearly impossible given that many engineering changes in Program C were due primarily to
changes in user needs and technology.
Several factors are likely contributors to this result. First, program schedule was a
priority in Program C. According to a program office representative, it was critical for the user
community to have the capabilities in hand at the contracted time. Therefore, as an interview
with one program office representative indicated, contractor and program office personnel
worked extra hours over a significant period of time in order to prevent the program schedule
from slipping. Second, the program's ability to properly define requirements'0 0 at an early stage
in the development, with the aid of IPTs, also helped Program C achieve this result.
Consequently, the program understood what could be added later and what could not. Finally,
the use of mature technology was also suggested by the program office representative as a factor
that helped to reduce schedule risk. The newer technologies added via engineering changes were
proven, as opposed to developmental, technologies. Therefore, capabilities could be added
incrementally with little schedule risk.
Some qualifications should be made with regard to the program schedule-related data.
First, it should not be inferred that engineering changes are the only possible sources of program
schedule delays. As personnel interviewed at the System Program Office (SPO) indicated,
Contract Change Proposal (CCP) is another contract vehicle capable of allowing a program
schedule slip. For example, one major program milestone in Program A was delayed using a
CCP. CCPs were outside the scope of the data collected for this research. In addition, a System
Program Office representative pointed out that flight test failure by electronic mission
subsystems could also lead to program schedule delay. It was also pointed out by the SPO that
Program B did not pass one major milestone test, and the program was set back by two years.
Second, the relatively low percentages of engineering changes that led to program schedule delays
should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the magnitudes of the delays were small.
100 Recall from Chapter 4 that only one engineering change in Program C was attributable to requirements definition
issues.
Third, the results showing the majority of engineering changes did not delay program schedule do
not imply that all tasks on the programs were completed on time.
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Figure 5-7: Specification-normalized impact of engineering changes on program
schedule
5.3 Impacts of Engineering Changes on Product Performance with Respect
to Expectations
Performance of a defense aerospace product is also one of the "things" of interest about a
program. It was necessary to think of performance relative to some customer expectation.
Otherwise, a qualitative judgement about its increase or decrease would be meaningless. For
example, an upgrade program should not make the performance of an existing product worse than
before the upgrade. Similarly, an unprecedented capability would always be a performance
increase when compared to not having that capability at all. Figure 5-8 shows the impacts of
engineering changes on product performance with respect to expectations.
A few remarks about the translation of relevant descriptive data into the results presented
in Figure 5-8 are in order. An engineering change incorporating recently available technology into
a product would be categorized as an engineering change that increased product performance
beyond originally specified customer expectations if the descriptive data indicated that the
customer did not actively seek out the technology. On the other hand, an engineering change
modifying requirements to accept obtainable capabilities instead of continuing development
would be an engineering change that decreased product performance below what was originally
specified. An example of engineering changes done to meet shifted expectation would be one that
was done to incorporate updated training simulators at the request of the customer. Furthermore,
engineering changes done to fix deficiencies and effect redesigns would be considered those done
to meet existing expectations. Finally, engineering changes inferred to not have impacted
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Figure 5-8: Impacts of engineering changes on product performance with respect to
expectations
The lowest cluster of bars in Figure 5-8 was the one representing engineering changes
having the impact of delighting the customer by increasing product performance beyond
expectations. A surprising aspect of the result is that the three programs appear to be relatively
even in terms of delighting the customer, given that it would have been more difficult for
Programs A and B to do so since they had more substantial developmental content than Program
C had.
Also, Program C had a comparatively smaller proportion of engineering changes done to
modify requirements to accept obtainable performance. One possible explanation is that Program
C's relatively low developmental content1 'o gave it fewer unknowns to begin with. It could also
be inferred that the use of IPTs contributed to Program C's ability to understand more unknowns
earlier, thereby reducing the need to lower requirements later in the program.
Figure 5-8 shows that more than 50% of engineering changes on each program were made
to enable products to meet the customers' shifted and original expectations. Focusing on the
cluster of bars representing engineering changes done to meet shifted expectations, it could be
argued that understanding requirements early and having a "simpler" problem allowed Program C
to make relatively fewer engineering changes in meeting original expectations and to focus more
directly on accommodating shifted expectations.
Program C also had higher proportions of its engineering changes not impacting
performance than the other two programs had. This was consistent with the observation in
Chapter 4 that documentation changes represented one of the dominant causes of engineering
changes in Program C.
Figure 5-9 provides a specification-normalized version of Figure 5-8. A comparison
between Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-9 shows that the results in Figure 5-8 are sensitive to the
specification-based normalization. For example, the normalized results show that fewer than
50% of engineering changes in Program B were made to meet expectations by meeting shifted and
original expectations. This is because relatively many such engineering changes on Program B
only impacted specifications lower than the mission system specification (MSS), and were thus
removed by the normalization procedure. In addition, the normalization also increased the
relative importance of engineering changes in Programs A and B that did not impact performance.
Hence, Program C no longer has the highest proportion of engineering changes that had not
impacted product performance.
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Figure 5-9: Specification-normalized impacts of engineering changes on product
performance with respect to expectations
5.4 Impacts of Engineering Changes on Prime Contractor(s)' Work
This impact area focuses more on the "people" aspects of complexity than previous
impact areas did. Results represented by each cluster of bars in Figure 5-10 are explained and are
related to program characteristics. An immediate observation is that all engineering changes on
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Figure 5-10: Impacts of engineering changes on prime contractor(s)' work
"Rework" occurred when something had to be done to repeat a task that was not done
correctly the first time. Examples of rework for prime contractors include documentation
corrections, repairs of existing products, and even significant redesigns traceable to requirements
definition issues. The prime contractor of Program C had the least rework compared to those of
Programs A and B. Properly defined requirements in the early phases of the program, aided by
the use of IPTs, led to this result. Based on a close examination of the descriptions of engineering
changes conducted as a part of this research, it was estimated that had IPTs been used during the
development phases of Programs A and B, their percentages of engineering changes in the
"rework" cluster could have been potentially reduced by 11.6 and 9.7102 percentage points,
respectively.
"New work" for the prime contractors involved tasks accomplished to adopt improved
technologies and address evolving user needs. Engineering Changes in Program C led to relatively
more new work for the prime contractor than did those in Programs A and B, because of
numerous engineering changes in Program C to accommodate evolving user needs and technology.
102 These engineering changes included some of those that were due primarily to requirements definition issues, and
had potential to be avoided had functioning IPTs been in place. This observations is inferred from ECP descriptive
data and interview results.
101
Finally, the lowest and non-zero cluster of bars in Figure 5-10 is that representing "less
work" for the prime contractors. These engineering changes allowed the prime contractors to do
less work than they otherwise would have performed without the engineering changes. An
example would be an engineering change made to lower product performance requirements. By
approving such an engineering change, the customer basically agrees to accept obtainable
performance from the products of the program, which usually mean that the prime contractor can
do less developmental work on that product.
Figure 5-11 below represents the specification-normalized version of Figure 5-10. The
comparative relationships between engineering changes within each cluster remain largely the
same as those in Figure 5-10. Programs A and B engineering changes in the "rework" cluster
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Figure 5-11: Specification-normalized impacts of engineering changes on prime
contractor(s)' work
103 This estimate pertains to those engineering changes that were due primarily to requirements definition issues,
which had the potential to be avoided had IPTs been in place and functioning, as inferred from ECP descriptive data
and interview results. These engineering changes refer to those impacting SS and/or MSS only.
102
5.5 Impacts of Engineering Changes on Supplier(s)' Work
This impact area is similar to the one regarding the impact of engineering changes on prime
contractor's work. However, a difference between the results of these two impact areas, that can
be immediately identified from Figure 5-12, is that data indicated that some engineering changes in
the three programs did not impact suppliers.
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Figure 5-12: Impacts of engineering changes on supplier(s)' work
Descriptive data about the engineering changes, supported by interview data, indicate that
some suppliers to the prime contractors of Programs A and B may have been able to avoid some
"rework" had IPTs been used to enable the prime contractors to better understand the
capabilities and limitations of these suppliers. Recall from Chapter 4 that key suppliers were
involved early in Programs A and B. Had IPTs been utilized, engineering changes in Programs A
and B leading to rework by suppliers might have been reduced by 13.3 and 9.7104 percentage
points, respectively.
"New work" means new responsibilities for the suppliers. For example, when
engineering changes called for the purchase of updated training equipment, the supplier of the
'04 These engineering changes included some of those that were due primarily to requirements definition issues, and
could potentially have been avoided had functioning IPTs been in place. This observation is inferred from ECP
descriptive data and interview results.
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training equipment would respond to the previously unknown purchase by providing the
updated training equipment as required by the engineering change.
Finally, a relatively small proportion of engineering changes led to "less work" for the
suppliers. This means that only a small proportion of engineering changes allowed suppliers to
reduce certain previously required tasks.
Figure 5-13 shows that specification-based normalization slightly altered the comparative
relationships between bars in the "rework" and "none" clusters. However, the interpretations of
the results based on program characteristics remain the same. The engineering changes in
Programs A and B that led to rework by subcontractors (suppliers) might have been reduced by
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Figure 5-13: Specification-normalized impacts of engineering changes on supplier(s)'
work
05 These engineering changes were those due primarily to requirements definition issues, and had the potential to be
avoided had IPTs been in place and functioning. The observation is inferred from ECP descriptive data and
interview results. These engineering changes selected from those impacting SS and/or MSS only.
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5.6 Impacts of Engineering Changes on Other Programs under the Same
SPO
This section discusses the impact of engineering changes across programs managed by
different program offices in the same SPO. Figure 5-14 shows the proportions of engineering
changes in each of the three case-study programs that impacted and did not impact at least one
other program in the same System Program Office.
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Figure 5-14: Impacts of engineering changes on other program in the SPO
Within the confines of the three case-study programs, Program A was the predecessor to
Program B. In other words, the progress of Program B depended somewhat on that of Program
A. In fact, engineering change data and interviews with program office and contractor personnel
indicated that it was necessary for Program B to incorporate applicable engineering changes from
Program A into its own design baseline. In addition, interviews with contractor personnel
suggested that two engineering changes that involved realigning flight tests for Program C enabled
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Figure 5-15: Specification-normalized impacts of engineering changes on other programs
in SPO
Figure 5-15 shows the specification-normalized results shown in Figure 5-14. While the
patterns in the former approximated their counterparts in the latter, some differences in
magnitudes of numbers require explanation. Many Program A engineering changes removed by
the normalization were fixes to the already-built products that would not affect the design of the
Subsystem B 1 of Program B. Therefore, the percentage of Program A engineering changes that
impacted Program B dropped from 12.1% to 5.1%. All Program B engineering changes that
descriptive data indicated as having impacted other programs were eliminated through
normalization, which would explain 0.0% for Program B in Figure 5-15.
5.7 Engineering Changes Leading to Unanticipated Engineering Changes in
the Same Program
Another question regarding impacts of engineering changes is whether an engineering
change resulted in subsequent, unexpected engineering changes. This impact area should not be
confused with planned engineering changes. Figure 5-16 shows the results, which indicate that
engineering changes seldom lead to surprises in the same program that require additional
engineering changes. The results imply that the configuration control process, with the primes
106
94.9%1 fno/
and suppliers 0 6 preparing and submitting ECPs, and users and program offices reviewing ECPs,
has been conducive to understanding the impacts of engineering changes on a change-by-change
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Figure 5-16: Engineering changes leading to unanticipated engineering changes over the
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Figure 5-17: Specification-normalized engineering changes leading to unanticipated
engineering changes over the same issue in the same program
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5.8 Summary of Findings about Impacts of Engineering Changes
This section reviews the key findings detailed earlier in this chapter and discusses the
implications of these findings. Appropriate figure numbers are included to refer back to the
detailed discussions.
The data presented earlier in this chapter indicated that every engineering change examined
as part of this research had a near-term cost impact, and that the near-term cost would almost
always be higher than would have been the case without the engineering change (Figure 5-1).
Thus, it would be desirable, in general, if the engineering changes were made to be responsive
(able to meet shifted expectations) to evolutions in user needs and technology. It would be less
effective to have prime contractors and suppliers do rework (Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-12) in
order to meet expectations that should have been met in the first place (Figure 5-8). In addition,
it appeared that engineering changes in the three case study programs seldom resulted in
exceeding product performance expectations (Figure 5-8). Similarly, earlier discussions also
indicated that engineering changes infrequently led to less work for prime contractors and their
suppliers. In other words, engineering changes rarely seem to relieve contractors from their
contracted requirements (Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-12). Data and discussion in the chapter also
showed that engineering changes, in general, enabled the contractors to meet customer
expectations. The cost increases for the various communities in product development
represented the "prices" paid for meeting these expectations.
The research also found that engineering changes seldom led to program schedule delays
(Figure 5-6). This finding does not imply that every task on the programs was done at the
expected time. However, the finding does seem to imply that the tasks were managed in such a
way as to not adversely impact program schedule. Even in cases where some engineering changes
led to program schedule delays, those changes were in the small minority, and the delays had to
be accepted, or else capabilities could not be realized. Not allowing program schedule slips
unless absolutely necessary implied great discipline in controlling engineering changes.
Program C was able to make many engineering changes in response to evolutions in user
needs and technology without much rework for the prime contractor and suppliers (Figure 5-10
108
and Figure 5-12) and no program schedule slip. Several factors may have contributed to these
results. First, Program C recognized schedule as a priority. Second, the program's ability to
properly define requirements early provided opportunities to be responsive to evolutions in user
needs and technology. Finally, the use of mature, as opposed to developmental, technologies
helped in reducing schedule risk.
Finally, the discipline and capabilities of personnel involved on the programs were
perhaps best demonstrated by the finding shown in Figure 5-16. If Goode and Machol were
correct that complexity of the system is not well understood unless the nonlinear effects of
changes are well elaborated'I 7, then the complexity of the systems on the three programs appear
to have been well managed on a change-by-change basis because issues believed to be resolved by
engineering changes rarely created surprises requiring subsequent engineering changes.
5.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter focused on the impacts of engineering changes. Findings and lessons learned
in this regard were developed based on engineering changes collected as part of this research, and
the characteristics of the three case-study programs.
In order to further study the causes and impacts of engineering changes in the three case-
study programs, it would be useful to explore the pair-wise relationships between causes,
impacts, and time. These relationships are the topics for Chapter 6.
107 Goode, Harry H. and Robert E. Machol. System Engineering: An Introduction to the Design ofLarge-Scale
Systems. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1957, pp. 5 -6 .
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6. Relationships between Primary Causes, Impacts, and Time
This chapter provides a further discussion on the nature of engineering changes based on
data from the three case-study programs. More specifically, this chapter examines three
relationships involving engineering changes: impacts vs. primary causes, impacts vs. time, and
primary causes vs. time. The discussion here seeks to identify broader trends and patterns than
those explored in Chapters 4 and 5.
6.1 Impacts vs. Primary Causes
The analysis discussed in this section is based on the quantitative results presented in
Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 discussed the relative importance of causes of engineering changes
in each of the three case-study programs, and identified the dominant causes across the three
case-study programs. Chapter 5 presented a discussion of the impacts of engineering changes in
terms of seven impact areas. In light of these findings, it would be desirable to examine whether
some primary causes result in engineering changes of high impact. A high-impact engineering
change is defined here as one that affects at least four out of the seven impact areas examined in
Chapter 5. In this sense, "high impact" is a short-cut designation for "high scope of impact,"
which is different from "high magnitude of impact."
An example of the application of the definition and related considerations is shown in
Table 6-1. Engineering changes included in Table 6-1 are those in all three programs that were
due primarily to requirements definition issues. The engineering change identification numbers
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21 1A 1 2 1 12 2 2 2 3
22 IB 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 3
23 1A 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 4
Table 6-1: Example data for impacts vs. primary causes study
Each row in Table 6-1 contains data indicating whether an impact area is affected by each
engineering change. For example, Chapter 5 presented four ways in which product performance
with respect to expectations may be impacted by an engineering change. If an engineering change
affects product performance in any of the four ways, it is assigned the numerical designation "1"
in Column 5 of Table 6-1; otherwise, it is assigned a numerical designation "2", which indicates
that the impact area is not affected by the engineering change. Summing the number of "1"
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row. This sum is then given in the "Number of 'yes' impacts" column (Column 10) in Table 6-1.
A sum of four or more "yes" designations means the engineering change is considered to have had
"high impact".
Using the complete table for all primary causes has resulted in two classes of results. The
first quantifies the percentage of high-impact engineering changes due to each primary cause,
while the second quantifies the mean (average) number of areas impacted by the engineering
changes due to each primary cause.
6.1.1 Percentage of High-Impact Engineering Changes due to each Primary Cause
Figure 6-1 shows the percentage of high-impact engineering changes due to each primary
cause. The figure is based on the comprehensive set of engineering change data, and the number
of engineering changes from all three programs due to each primary cause is indicated in the labels
on the horizontal axis. The first bar in Figure 6-1 is a result of summing the number of
engineering changes in Table 6-1 that impacted four or more areas out of seven, and dividing the
sum by 23, which represents the total number of engineering changes due mainly to requirements












Reqmts Changes in Fix deficiencies Govt-prime Program-to- Technigy Documentation
Odefinition needs (17) (18) interactn (13) program change (27) changes (11)
issues (23) interactn (9)
Primary Causes
Based on comprehensive set of engineering changes (118) across the three programs.
Figure 6-1: Percentage of engineering changes with high impact due to each primary
cause
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Figure 6-1 shows that three out of the four dominant causes of engineering changes
identified at the end of Chapter 4 (i.e., requirements definition issues, changes in needs, and fixing
deficiencies) appeared to be the top three causes most likely to lead to high-impact engineering
changes. Also according to Figure 6-1, government-prime interactions was another primary cause
mostly likely to result in high-impact engineering changes. This means that if the causes of
engineering changes were weighted by scope of impacts, government-prime interactions would
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Figure 6-2: Specification-normalized percentage of high-impact engineering changes vs.
causes
The specification-normalized version of Figure 6-1, shown in Figure 6-2, shows that the
four dominant causes identified in Chapter 4 (i.e., requirements definition issues, changes in user
needs, the need to fix deficiencies, and changes in technology) were the major sources of high-
impact engineering changes. It should also be noted that the government-prime interactions is not
far behind in terms of the percentage of engineering changes that could be construed as having
high impact.
6.1.2 Mean Number of Areas Impacted vs. Primary Causes
An alternative method for analyzing the relationship between impacts of engineering
changes and primary causes is to examine the mean number of areas impacted by engineering
changes due to each primary cause. The mean number of areas impacted by engineering changes
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due to requirements definition issues was the result of summing the magnitudes of the numbers in
the "Number of 'yes' impacts" column in Table 6-1, and dividing the sum by 23, which
represents the total number of engineering changes in the three programs that were due primarily
to requirements definition issues. The resulting mean (average), 4.4, is displayed on top of the
first bar in Figure 6-3. The same procedure was used in computing the other mean values
presented in Figure 6-3.
Using this measure, and basing the analysis on the comprehensive set of engineering
change data collected for this research, Figure 6-3 indicates that engineering changes due primarily
to the four dominant causes identified in Section 4.5.2 were, on the average, of high impact. In a
statistical sense, each measure of mean displayed in Figure 6-3 can be interpreted as the expected
value of the number of areas that would be impacted by an engineering change due to each
primary cause.




Reqmts Changes in Fix deficiencies Govt-prime Program-to- Technigy Documentatn
definition needs (17) (22) interactn (13) program change (23) changes (11)
issues (23) Primary Causes interactn (9)
Based on all 118 engineering changes in the three case-study programs.
Figure 6-3: Mean number of areas impacted by engineering changes due to each primary
cause
The result is also robust when only the engineering changes affecting high-level
specifications were considered, as shown in Figure 6-4. In the results with and without
specification-based normalization, an engineering change due primarily to government-prime
interactions could be expected to impact almost four out of the seven areas, thereby elevating this
cause to another major source of high-impact engineering changes.
115





Reqmts Changes in Fix deficiencies Govt-prime Program-to- Technigy Documentatn
definition needs (12) (9) interactn (11) program change (21) changes (10)
issues (14) interactn (8)
Primary Causes
Based on total of 85 engineering changes affecting SS and/or MSS only.
Figure 6-4: Specification-normalized mean number of areas impacted by engineering
changes due to each primary cause
6.2 Variation of the Scope of Impact Over Time
The analysis of the impact vs. time relationship, using the engineering change data from
the three case-study programs, was motivated by the often-heard observation that the cost of
making an engineering change increases with time10 8. The question applicable to this research is:
Does the number of areas (out of the seven discussed in Chapter 5) impacted by engineering
changes increase with time? In other words: Does the scope of the impact of engineering changes
become broader over time?
The analysis was conducted by first considering when the first ECP on each program was
received by the program office. Between that date and the date of receipt of the last available
ECP from that program (as of 17 November 1997) was the time interval that was further divided
into five smaller, equal intervals, or "time phases".
108 The implication of this observation is that in developing a complex product, engineering changes introduced in
later stages of the design process have a higher probability of creating a greater chain reaction of impacts involving
many other components and hence result in considerably higher costs, compared with engineering changes made in
earlier stages of the design process. An example of such observation was discussed in Boppe, Charles W.
"Complex Product Design Process: Elements, Relationships, Process Flow." MIT 16.870 Aerospace Product
Design lecture notes. Fall 1996, focusing on data shown for a major electronic component.
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The example data shown in Table 6-2 represents the "Time phase 1" portion of the data
used for this analysis. The engineering changes in this interval ("time phase") are those received
during the first of the five intervals of each program as defined above. Their identification
numbers in Column 1 of Table 6-2 have been modified to disguise the identity of the three case-
study programs. It is useful to understand that these engineering changes are not necessarily the
same ones as those shown in Table 6-1 because the data are now sorted in terms of time, not in
terms of primary causes, as was the case before. Furthermore, the number of impact areas
affected by each engineering change in the three case-study programs was already known, as
described in Section 6-1.
1 2 3 4
Engineering "Time phase" (1, 2, Number of areas Simple statistics
Change Number 3, 4, or 5) in which impacted
Designation the ECP was ("Number of 'yes'
received impacts" from
Table 6-1)
1 1 3 Average number of
2 1 3 areas impacted



















phase 1" = 18
Table 6-2: Example data for impacts vs. time analysis
The mean (average) number of impact areas affected by engineering changes in this time
interval is obtained by dividing the sum of the numbers in Column 3 of Table 6-2 by 18, which
represents the total number of engineering changes received during the first of five time intervals
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of each of the three case-study programs. The result, 4.3, is shown in Column 4 of Table 6-2, as
well as above the first bar in Figure 6-5. The mean number of areas impacted by engineering
changes in other time intervals were obtained in the same fashion.
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Based on all 118 engineering changes in database.
Figure 6-5: Scope of impact of engineering changes vs. time
The results in Figure 6-5 indicate that the mean number of impact areas affected by
engineering changes in the three case-study programs remains relatively constant over time. Why
the seeming discrepancy between the often-heard increase-of-cost of making engineering changes
over time and the essentially constant scope (or breadth) of impact over time? The former
approximates the magnitude of average cost of making engineering change at different product life
cycle phases, without addressing impacts other than the cost of making such engineering changes.
The latter shows the time dependence of the number of areas impacted without addressing the
magnitude of the impact in each area. In short, the two observations pertain to different aspects
of the impacts of engineering changes. Specification-normalized results shown in Figure 6-6 also
demonstrate the nearly time-independent scope (or breadth) of impact of engineering changes.
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Figure 6-6: Specification-normalized scope of impact of engineering changes vs. time
6.3 Primary Causes Over Time
Finally, the third relationship addresses the question: Do engineering changes, due to
certain primary causes, tend to occur more frequently at certain times during the product
development process? This question is somewhat more difficult to address than the previous
two, since within each time interval, potentially seven 09 primary causes could be present in each
of the three programs.
Two steps have been taken in response to this difficulty. First, each primary cause was
examined one at a time, program by program, in order to verify whether the engineering changes
due to that primary cause were concentrated in certain time intervals in the course of all three
programs. Second, high-level causes of engineering changes were used in this analysis to ensure
that results are based on sufficient numbers of engineering changes. These high-level causal
categories, repeated here from Section 3.3, are (1) requirements-related issues; (2) the need to fix
deficiencies; (3) program interaction; (4) technological changes; and (5) documentation changes.
The results, shown in Appendix E, are quickly summarized here. Namely, no discernible
patterns emerge from this analysis. The patterns appear to be random across the three programs.
109 Eight in total if all causes of engineering changes included in the framework in Section 3.3.1 were used. Recall
from Chapter 4 that no engineering changes in the three case-study programs were found to be due primarily to
"funding reduction after program start".
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Aggregating the primary causes, as just noted, did not bring any greater clarity to the results
Consequently, no meaningful conclusion can be drawn based on this analysis.
6.4 Summary of Findings
This section summarizes the findings discussed earlier in the chapter. This chapter has
presented a discussion of three relationships among primary causes of engineering changes,
impacts of engineering changes, and time in order to explore further the nature and implications of
engineering changes in the three case-study programs.
The analysis of the relationship between primary causes and impacts showed that
engineering changes due mainly to the four dominant causes across the three case-study programs
tended to be of high-impact. An engineering change was defined to have had high impact if it
affected at least four of the seven areas identified. In this sense, "high impact" is a short-cut
designation for "high scope (or breadth) of impact," which is different from "high magnitude of
impact." This result was supported by data on the percentage of engineering changes with high
impact due to each primary cause. This result was further verified by examining the mean
number of areas impacted by engineering changes due to each primary cause.
The distribution of impacts over time showed that the mean number of areas impacted by
engineering changes (i.e., the scope of impact) remained relatively constant over time. However,
the finding did not address the degree of severity, or the magnitude, of each impact. For example,
it could not shed light on the order of magnitude of the near-term cost impact, or the labor-hours
required to implement engineering changes made at different times. Therefore, the finding only
addressed the scope (or breadth) of impact of engineering changes over time.
Finally, the primary causes vs. time analysis tentatively revealed no particular pattern of
causes of engineering changes over time. In other words, engineering changes occurred as they
did, and their causes did not reveal any particular pattern in terms of their frequency distribution




This chapter reviews the research documented in this thesis. It first provides a brief
discussion of the research objectives, key questions, and research method. It then highlights the
key findings. Finally, it addresses the limitations of the research and the findings, and suggests
directions for future research on engineering changes.
7.1 Review of Research Objectives, Key Questions, and Research Design
This research was conducted with two objectives in mind. One objective, in light of the
gaps of knowledge identified in existing engineering change-related literature, was to contribute
new knowledge in the area of engineering changes by concentrating on the fundamental nature, the
causes and impacts, of Class I engineering changes in the context of US defense aerospace
product development. The second objective was to develop guidelines for reducing defense
aerospace product development cycle time and cost.
Achieving these objectives required an understanding of Class I engineering changes
(heretofore referred to as engineering changes). These are engineering changes that fundamentally
modify the form, fit, and/or function of a defense product in such a way that the functionalities
or physical configuration of the product are different before and after the change. Specifically,
three key questions central to this research were posed about engineering changes:
* What are the causes and impacts of engineering changes?
* What are specific product development practices that would help reduce the number of
undesirable engineering changes?
* What can the acquisition customer organizations do to reduce the number of undesirable
engineering changes?
In order to gain sufficient insight into these key questions, the research was structured to
be case study-based. The case-studies focused on three major United States Air Force (USAF)
aircraft acquisition programs in the electronics sector. All three programs (Programs A, B, and C)
are the responsibility of a single System Program Office (SPO). Data on 118 engineering changes
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were collected from contractor-submitted Class I Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) archived
at the SPO. In addition, supporting documents pertaining to the three programs, as well as to the
specific systems and subsystems within each of the three programs, were collected in order to
assist in developing a comprehensive understanding of these engineering changes. Furthermore,
engineers and managers from three prime contractors (X, Y, and Z) and the program offices were
interviewed to obtain their perspectives on the programs and the engineering changes. Finally,
frameworks for categorizing causes and impacts of engineering changes were proposed and
utilized to enable the analysis of the data collected. The analysis led to the findings highlighted
below.
7.2 Summary of Major Findings
7.2.1 Causes of Engineering Changes
Two key findings pertaining to the causes of engineering changes in the three case-study
programs should be highlighted. First, the four dominant causes of engineering changes across the
three programs were found to be the design assumptions made in the initial phases of the
programs, evolution of user needs as programs progressed over time, the need to correct
design/product deficiencies, and changes in technology. Second, however, the combinations of
dominant causes were different from program to program, and were strongly dependent on the
characteristics of the individual programs.
7.2.2 Impacts of Engineering Changes
The findings pertaining to the impacts of engineering changes in the three case-study
programs encompassed seven areas, or ways, in which the program and communities involved in
defense aerospace product development could be affected by engineering changes. For example,
it was found that most of the engineering changes tended to increase the near-term cost of the
programs. On the other hand, only a small share of the total number of engineering changes in the
three programs impacted program schedule. In addition, all engineering changes that impacted
schedule always delayed the program. In terms of product performance, the majority of
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engineering changes in the three programs appeared to have been implemented to meet product
performance expectations, either by meeting shifted expectations or by meeting original
expectations. Furthermore, it was found that engineering changes rarely relieved prime
contractors and suppliers from their contracted requirements. In addition, whether engineering
changes on one program impacted other programs within the same SPO depended significantly on
the relationship between the programs. Finally, engineering changes in each of the three case-
study programs rarely resulted in subsequent, unanticipated engineering changes in the same
program.
7.2.3 Relationships between Causes, Impacts, and Time
The pair-wise relationships between causes and impacts of engineering changes and time
were also explored. It was found that the engineering changes due to the four dominant causes
identified in Section 7.2.1 were most likely to be of high impact - at least four out of seven areas
(discussed in Section 7.2.2) were affected by an engineering change. Furthermore, the average
number of areas impacted by engineering changes in the three case-study programs remained
relatively constant over time. Finally, no particular relationship between the causes of
engineering changes and time was found.
7.2.4 Defense Aerospace Product Development Issues
The three case-study programs provided some lessons learned about defense aerospace
product development. The lessons learned pertain to the use off-the-shelf subsystems, the use
of the associate contractor arrangement in development programs, the use of IPTs and early
supplier integration into product development, and the use of mature technologies.
The Program A case study provided an important lesson about the use of off-the-shelf
subsystems. Subsystem Al was an advanced subsystem developed and produced for another
branch of the armed services. In this case, the initial assumption that it could be easily adopted,
with little modification, for operations in a significantly different environment led to substantial
redesigns on an off-the-shelf item. The implication is that the use of an off-the-shelf subsystem,
without a firm understanding of the operational environment within which the subsystem must
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function, may lead to substantial redesigns, thereby eroding the possible benefits of using the off-
the-shelf subsystem in the first place.
The Program B case study provided some insight into the use of the associate contractor
arrangement (i.e., having two prime contractors) on development programs. The use of the
associate contractor arrangement during full-scale development necessitated two engineering
changes to address one change issue if it affected both associate contractors. Government and
contractor personnel also pointed out that in the development of a complex product, such as
Subsystem B1, the use of the associate contractor arrangement increased the possibility of
specifications managed by the two separate contractors becoming inconsistent. The
observations, however, should not be taken as a commentary on the merits of developmental
programs in which multiple prime contractors develop equivalent but competing products with
the understanding that there will be an eventual downselect to one prime contractor.
Findings related to the use of integrated product teams (IPTs) and early supplier
integration into product development were also derived from the case-study programs. First, it
was found that the prime contractor's use of IPTs, for development-related activities, helped
reduce the proportion of engineering changes that were due primarily to requirements definition.
Second, despite the early involvement of key suppliers in Programs A and B, some requirements
definition issues were found to remain, necessitating redesigns later in the programs. The case
studies provided indications that, had IPTs been used during the development phases of these
programs, the prime contractors may have been able to have a better understanding of the
capabilities of their key suppliers and hence be better equipped to clarify some of the key
requirements early in the programs, thereby avoiding some undesirable engineering changes and
significant redesigns.
Finally, the experience of Program C may illustrate some benefits associated with using
mature technologies. The use of mature, as opposed to developmental, technologies when
feasible enabled Program C to make numerous engineering changes to quickly achieve incremental
product improvements. In addition, the use of mature technologies helped Program C make these
engineering changes without program schedule delay.
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7.3 Limitations of the Research and the Findings
There are at least three limitations of the research and the resulting findings that should be
mentioned. The limitations pertain to the case study approach, the scope of the research, and the
lack of direct inputs from the user community and subcontractors.
One major limitation of the research is that it was based on case studies focusing on three
aircraft programs in the electronics sector under the same SPO. While focusing on these case-
study programs within the same SPO helped control variability that may exist across different
SPOs, it may be worth noting that the lessons learned about defense aerospace product
development on the basis of these three case studies may not be directly applicable to other
sectors of the defense aerospace industry.
The broad scope of the research can be considered as another limitation. The research
studied seven possible impacts of engineering changes without addressing any of the them in
detail. For example, no useful data were available to quantify the cost of making Class I
engineering changes across the user community, the acquisition community, and/or the
contractors.
Finally, direct inputs from the user community and subcontractors (suppliers) may have
provided additional insights into the three case study programs. However, this would have
required permission from both the SPO and prime contractors to obtain access to these sources,
and the time required to obtain such permission would have been prohibitively long for this
research.
7.4 Suggestions for Future Research
In light of the limitations of this research identified above, several directions of future
research can be suggested:
* The research might be repeated using other case-study programs in the electronics sector,
perhaps by focusing on programs in the same SPO that managed the three programs studied
in this research. The goal would be to understand whether the findings and lessons learned
here apply to other programs.
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* A related suggestion would be to study programs under a single SPO that started at different
times. The goal would be to evaluate the possible effects of various acquisition reform
initiatives on engineering changes.
* The research reported here may also be repeated using case studies in other sectors of the
defense aerospace industry. One goal of doing so would be to determine the applicability of
the findings and lessons learned in other sectors.
* It may be useful to study the cost of making Class I engineering changes borne by different
communities involved with these engineering changes. Engineering change descriptive data
indicated that while some engineering changes made to correct deficiencies may be considered
as being "no cost" to the government, their implementation required additional work by the
user community. Can such work be systematically studied and understood in terms of
monetary expenditures? However, the experience of the research effort reported here was
that gathering credible cost data is problematic, so it may be very difficult to explore this area.
* Finally, instead of simply expanding the data collection effort to include the user community
and the suppliers, it may be possible to focus on the engineering changes that may highlight
issues at the prime contractor-supplier interface. This interface was one that this research
may not have adequately addressed due to lack of direct data from the suppliers.
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Appendix A. Details of Engineering Change-Related Literature
Review
This appendix presents eight engineering change-related publications that were reviewed
in detail in support of this research. A summary of these publications are first presented in a
table format, then the details of each review are included.
Research Type of data Interface(s) Type(s) of Nature of Findings
method & collected studied changes changes
setting studied studied
Barkan Summarizing Research Focused on Engineering Causes and Factors
findings by results of both design changes in impacts of explaining the
other others. and general; no engineering differences
researchers. production. -explicit changes between US &
differentiation. alluded to, but Japanese
in the context engineering








Hegde et Case study of Engineering Design- Number of Focused on ECOs were
al. one division change order manufacturing design the impact of detrimental to
within a large (ECO) data; interface changes in ECOs on the mfg.
company. part flow within one specifications time necessary completion
times in mfg.; business unit after traveler to complete time.
descriptive of large release" . the mfg. of
data on company. parts.
managerial
behavior.
Coughlan Case study Survey data Design- Focused on Focused on Experienced
based on 12 on products manufacturing what are called aspects ofmfg. mfg.
products from and mfg. interface to Class II (in engineering engineering
4 divisions in engineering study MIL-STD involvement staff on
the same staff contribution of terms) in product product
company. experience; mfg. engineering development development
engineering engineering to changes. that influence reduces
change data product manufacturabil changes;







110 Traveller is a card on which job history is recorded, and moves with the job as it proceeds from one operation to
the next. See Hegde et al.: 1992, p.345.
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Research Type of data Interface(s) Type(s) of Nature of Findings
method & collected studied changes changes
setting studied studied
Ettlie Survey study Return on Design- Engineering Reduction of Fewer the
across many investment, manufacturing changes prior engineering changes before
industries to training for interface. to start of changes via production
study early product volume EMI. start, more
mfg. development production. ROI; more
involvement team EMI, fewer
(EMI) in members; changes; more
conceptual engineering training, more
stage of changes; role EMI.
product of mfg. staff on
development product
(PD). development.
Fricke et About 20 Interview Product life Changes of Cause and High-level
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studies numerical seriousness. changes; impacts of






Kick Case study of Descriptive Product life None. Engineering Linked
a new product data about cycle, change changes to
development existing management system





Hooper Case study of Descriptive Design- Errors in the Focused on Improved the
a corrective data about manufacturing 777 electrical change 777 Electrical
action process process; interface. wiring implementatio Corrective
in the Boeing numerical data system. n; causes and Action





Wright Literature Papers and Predominantly Engineering Tools for Existing work
review. research design- changes after change done from
projects manufacturing production implementatio mfg.
related to interface. start. n and methods perspective,
engineering to improve not product
changes from change development/b










Barkan's publication was a chapter in Integrating Design and Manufacturing for
Competitive Advantage. The chapter was largely based on research carried out by others. It
studied possible reasons why US industries lagged behind their Japanese counterparts "...in
terms of engineering productivity as measured by total elapsed time required to develop new
products, by the total engineering man-hours required to develop new products, and by the
quality of the initial product design as measured by design changes late in the cycle, field defects,
and recalls." 112 Although the role of engineering changes was not the focus of study, it was one
of the major areas addressed.
Hypotheses Tested or Questions Asked
The main question Barkan sought to answer was: "Why should U.S. engineers require up
to twice the engineering manpower for twice the time in order to design comparable products [as
compared to their Japanese counterparts]?"" 3
Research Method
The research was conducted by consolidating results found by other researchers.
Findings
Barkan contended that the discrepancy in engineering productivity between American and
Japanese industries had to do with use of outside suppliers, working hours, overlapping design
activities, engineering procedures, and the control of engineering design changes 114 .  His
discussions on each of the reasons, while all important, only those on design changes are
highlighted here.
11 Barkan, Philip. "Productivity in the Process of Product Development - An Engineering Perspective". Integrating
Design and Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage, Gerald Susman, Ed. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 1992, pp. 5 6 -6 8 .
112 Barkan: 1992, p.56.
113 Barkan: 1992, p.56.
114 Barkan: 1992, pp.56-59.
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Sullivan", cited by Barkan, showed that the number of engineering changes per week
made by US auto makers peaked near production start, while the same made by Japanese auto
makers peaked not too long after project start. Barkan proposed to attribute the difference, and
the differences in scope of the engineering changes made at different times to eight factors 116:
1. Completeness of product definition,
2. Restriction of design innovations to proven technology,
3. Integration of experience,
4. Role of prototypes in enhancing design productivity,
5. Interdisciplinary experience and simultaneous engineering,
6. Structured methodologies and disciplined procedures,
7. Superior support infrastructure, and
8. Reduction in dimensional errors.
Two observations are noted here about these 8 factors in Barkan's work. First, they were
identified by Barkan as being able to explain how the US industries (automotive, photocopier) he
examined via the works of others might be able to make their engineering changes earlier, when
impacts are localized. Second, they can be applied to different levels of a system when the
system is decomposed into a hierarchy. For example, "complete product definition" implied
having a good understanding of system-level requirements, while "reduction in dimensional
errors" can be applied to the detail part-level of the system, and "integration of experience" can
be applied to individuals who build the parts, or individuals writing the requirements. The
second observation in turn implied that the engineering changes that these factors have an impact
on also apply to different levels of the system. This implication may become important when
deciding which types of engineering changes to focus the research on.
115 Sullivan, L. P. "QFD: The Beginning, The End, and the Problem In-Between." Quality Function Deployment,
A Collection of Presentations and Case Studies. Dearborn, MI: American Suppliers Institute, 1987. As quoted in
Barkan: 1992, p.5 8 .





Hegde, Kekre, and Kekre'17
Background
The empirical study documented in the paper by Hegde et al. attempted to identify
factors at the design-manufacturing interface that were responsible for manufacturing delays. The
paper itself focused on empirically attributing manufacturing delays to engineering change orders
(ECOs). For the ECOs, only their quantity was available to Hegde et al. since the company at
which the study was conducted kept no record on the nature of its ECOs" 8
Hypotheses Tested or Questions Asked
There were no explicit statements of hypotheses in the exploratory study as documented
in the paper by Hegde et al. Inferring from the contents of the paper, a plausible hypothesis
could have been: Engineering change orders are major factors causing time delays in the
manufacture of parts1 19
The authors of the paper wanted to relate high-level management issues to engineering
change orders (ECOs). More specifically, they wanted to understand from the interactions
between manufacturing and design engineering, purchasing, and quality assurance how engineering
change orders lead to time delays in manufacturing 20
Research Method
The research setting was a business unit (ABC) of a Fortune 500 company with each
product line manager in charge of purchasing, marketing, engineering, and manufacturing l21 . From
this business unit, Hegde et al. collected data, recorded by the company on "travellers"' 22, from
parts manufactured within the years 1988 and 1989. The researchers used the data to support
the derivation of empirical relationships showing impacts of ECOs on manufacturing time.
Findings
117 Hegde, G.G., Sham Kekre, and Sunder Kekre. "Engineering changes and time delays: A field Investigation."
International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 28. 1992. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., pp.3 4 1 -3 5 2 .
118 Hegde et al.: 1992, p.3 4 5 .




120 Based on the discussion in Hegde et al.: 1992, p. 3 4 2 .
121 Hegde et al.: 1992, p.3 4 4 .
122 According to the business unit at which the research was conducted, a "traveller" is a card that accompanies a
part, and records its manufacturing history. Hegde, et al.: 1992, p.3 4 5 .
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Based on single- and multi-variable regression analysis on the data, the authors showed
that each ECO increased the time each part spent in the manufacturing process by at least 11
days' 23 . Finally, Hegde et al. indicated the necessity of conducting similar studies at different
types of organizations 124
Coughlan 12 5
Background
The paper is yet another chapter in Integrating Design and Manufacturing for
Competitive Advantage. It reports on an empirical study of engineering changes in newly
developed products' 26. This detailed study that was able to derive from data lessons-learned
about the design-manufacturing interface for product development in general' 27
Hypothesis Tested or Questions Asked
The empirical study presented in this paper sought to answer two questions1 28:
1. Is the avoidance of engineering change in newly developed products associated with the way
manufacturing engineering staff are deployed during the product development process?
There factors involved with the deployment of manufacturing engineers in product
development were investigated12 9: manufacturing engineers' experiences, their emphasis on
manufacturability of designs, and the phasing of the manufacturing engineers' deployment
into product development. The impact of each factor on manufacturability-related
engineering changes was investigated.
2. Is an association between the avoidance of engineering change and the way these engineering
resources are deployed contingent on the development context?




124 Hegde et al.: 1992, p. 3 5 0 .
125 Coughlan, Paul D. "Engineering Change and Manufacturing Engineering Deployment in New Product
Development." Integrating Design and Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage, Gerald Susman, Ed. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 15 7 - 17 7 .
126 Coughlan: 1992, p. 15 7 .
127 Coughlan: 1992, p.171-176.
128 The questions taken as they are from Coughlan: 1992, p. 15 8.
129 Coughlan: 1992, pp. 16 7 - 17 1.
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With this question, Coughlan sought to know how relationships found in the previous
question might be different depending on the newness of the product.
The term "development context" in the second question was used by Coughlan to address the
degrees of product and process newness 30 . Newness 31, in turn, meant "...the degree of
similarity of a product to other members of its family." In order to operationalize the concept of
newness, its measurement "...included the degree to which preexisting product parts, process
equipment, tooling and manufacturing methods were altered or redesigned to suit the
requirements of the product under development.' 132
Research Method
In order to seek the data that would help him answer the two basic research questions,
Coughlan based his study on 12 electronic equipment products developed between 1983 and
1989 by four divisions of a major firm 33. In other words, this is a case study-based research
based on numerous, although somewhat similar, products.
The author of the paper collected data about engineering changes 134 and the hours 135
manufacturing engineers spent on product development from the company's internal files, while
data regarding manufacturing engineers' experience with prior products were derived from
responses from managers to survey questions136. From what one can see from the data presented
in the paper, statistical analyses were done on the raw data to draw correlations when
appropriate.
Findings
Coughlan found that engineering changes apparent to the customer 37 (akin to Class I
engineering changes in MIL-STD terms) were avoidable prior to production start. On the other
hand, manufacturability-related engineering changes were apparent to manufacturing but not the
130 Coughlan: 1992, pp.16 1-162.
131 Definition provided on p.162 of the paper.
132 Coughlan: 1992, p. 16 2 .
133 Coughlan: 1992, p. 15 8 .




135 Coughlan: 1992, p. 16 0
.
136 Coughlan: 1992, p. 16 1.
137 Coughlan: 1992, p. 15 8 .
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customer 38 (akin to Class II engineering changes in MIL-STD terms), were most detrimental to
company. Therefore, a lot of effort was devoted in his study to the manufacturability-related
engineering changes, and Table A-2 shows a summary of findings in this regard.
The most valuable lesson from Coughlan's study is that one should never ignore the
importance of the experience carried over by ME staff from one product development project to
another. Their experience reduced the number of manufacturability-related engineering changes
after start of volume production in both newer and derived products at the firm where the
research was conducted. A more subtle result from this study is that early (concept definition
stage) involvement of ME staff on product development teams increased the incidences of
manufacturability-related engineering changes for less-new products. Is there similar concern
with the early involvement of customer and key suppliers on the prime contractor's defense
aircraft product development efforts?
138 Coughlan: 1992, p. 15 8. Class I and Class II ECPs are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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ME staff experience & Emphasis on Phasing of ME deployment
manufacturability-related manufacturability and & manufacturability-
engineering changes manufacturability-related related engineering changes
engineering changes
Newer products The higher the experience of Data available for statistical * Data showed no
ME staff in product analysis showed that association between ME
development team, the fewer emphasis on time expenditure during
the incidents of manufacturing manufacturability led to fewer definition stage of
related engineering incidents of product development and
changes' 3 . manufacturability-related incidences of
engineering changes, despite manufacturability-related
the incompleteness of engineering changes 41
information due to the * During verification stage
relatively unprecedented of product development,
nature of these newer the incidences of
products 140. manufacturability-related
engineering changes were
fewer as ME spend more
time in this stage42
Less-new Same as above . Data did not show * Incidences of
products association between ME's manufacturability-related
emphasis on engineering changes
manufacturability and increased with higher
manufacturability-related ME time expenditure
engineering changes'". during definition stage of
product development
because ME viewed these
products as repeats and
based decisions on prior
designs without
considering thoroughl
the subtle differences .
* For the verification stage
of product development,
the result is the same for
all products 46




























Ettlie's study was done to fill a knowledge gap in concurrent engineering. The gap was
the lack of details regarding how manufacturing personnel should be involved in the development
of new products 4 8. He focused on the nature of early manufacturing involvement (EMI) in
development of new products; the term "early" refers to the concept development stage149
Hypotheses Tested or Questions Asked
Ettlie's paper explicitly stated three hypotheses 150 he wanted to test in order to highlight
the role of manufacturing in new product development:
1. The fewer design change requests for a new product just before launch, the more likely the
new product will be a commercial success.
2. Early (as opposed to late or no) manufacturing involvement (EMI) in the design process for
new products in likely to reduce the number of pre-launch design change requests.
3. The more training provided for new product team members, the more likely EMI can and will
be used in the development process.
Research Method
The study was based on two surveys targeted at two different samples of respondents.
Each survey is described in turn.
The population of the first survey administered as part of Ettlie's study consisted of 122
US firms producing durable goods in the automotive, aerospace, machine tools, and appliance
industries.'' 51 . The return rate was 36% (43 firms); the surveys were mostly filled out by mid-
level managers within these firms 152.
147 Ettlie, John E. "Early Manufacturing Involvement in New Product Development." Proceedings of the IEEE
Engineering Management Conference, 1995. pp. 104-109.
148 Ettlie: 1995, p. 10 4 .
149 Ettlie: 1995, p. 10 4
.
150 Taken directly from Ettlie: 1995, pp. 10 5 -10 6 .
151 The surveyed population briefly described on p. 104 and p. 106.
152 Ettlie: 1995, p. 10 6
.
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The second survey' 53 was sent to 431 US companies that performed R&D. It was to be
filled out by chief technical officers or chief executive officers. Twenty-nine percent (126 firms)
of these surveys were returned from firm that produce electrical machinery, instruments,
transportation equipment, and non-electrical machinery.
All the findings below were derived from the two sets of survey responses.
Findings
The results from both surveys supported the three hypotheses the study set out to
test' 54. Statistical analyses showed that return on investment was significantly associated with
low number of design change requests before production started. Furthermore, early
manufacturing involvement in new product development was significantly related to fewer design
change requests before production start. Finally, data analyses showed that when more training




This paper differed from the majority of those reviewed, as exemplified by the paper by
Hegde et al., in that it encompassed a larger variety of engineering changes, and explored the
relationship between engineering changes and interactions among distinctive organizations. In
fact, Fricke et al. stated that the term "changes", synonymous with engineering changes, "...
encompasses all kinds of changes, whether changes of needs, requirements, specs, already built
components, processes, cost, schedule and so on."' 56  Furthermore, this paper explicitly
categorized causes and effects, or impacts, of engineering changes.
Hypotheses Tested or Questions Asked
'5 The surveyed population briefly described on p.104 and p. 106.
154 The rest of the discussion about this paper come from pp. 107-108.
155 Fricke, Ernst, Bernd Gebhard, et al. "No Innovation Process without Changes, but..." Proceedings of the
Seventh Annual International Symposium of the International Council on Systems Engineering, Vol. 1. August 3-7,
1997, Los Angeles, CA. pp.601-608.
156 Fricke et al.: 1997, p. 6 0 1
.
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The study whose results are reported in the paper was descriptive. As such, the paper
did not start out with a hypothesis to test. However, it focused on the following implicit
questions:
1. What are the causes and effects of changes?
2. What are some strategies that can be used to exploit changes to facilitate innovation in
designing systems?
Research Method
The authors and associated researchers held interviews with engineers and managers at
about 20 firms in various German industries157. Interview results formed the basis of the
descriptive study.
Findings
The findings answered the two implicit questions the authors sought to address. They
included the causes and effects of changes in product development, and the strategies that can be
used to manage and exploit the changes for product improvement.
The authors identified three broad categories of changes 158: technical factors, human
factors, and planning/management factors. Technical factors may cause engineering changes due
to the possibility that in the development of complex systems (or products), adding a new
technology or process can yield unexpected consequences that require engineering changes to
address. Human factors can cause changes in design because people can be frequently forced to
make decision based on incomplete information due to time pressures. The incompleteness of
information may in turn be caused by delayed communications between people who have the
updated information and those who need the updated information to make decisions. Finally,
changes can be driven by planning/management factors such as poor coordination with one's
external suppliers. Poor communication can also play into the planning and management across
companies. Once a process was set up incorrectly due to the aforementioned problems, changes
to the process or the resulting product might have to be made.
157 Based on in-person discussion with Fricke, July 17, 1998.
158 The discussion on findings regarding the causes of changes are based on Fricke et al.: 1997, p.6 0 2 .
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Fricke et al. identified both negative and positive effects 59 (or impacts) of engineering
changes on product development. According to the authors, negative impacts are those
associated with increased cost and delayed schedule. On the contrary, engineering changes can
have positive impacts on product development because they represent opportunities to improve
the product.
The existence of negative and positive impacts of engineering changes led the authors to
proposed five strategies160 for managing, and taking advantage of, engineering changes. The first
method to manage changes is to have fewer of them. Fricke et al. suggested that a product
development organization can reduce unnecessary changes while enabling innovation by
thoroughly understanding the requirements, reducing unnecessary specifications, and
distinguishing changes by their nature, timing, and likely effects. Second, changes can be better
managed by detecting and making them as early as possible. The authors contended that
necessary changes, when detected earlier in the product development process, can bring benefits
to the product without risking cost and schedule problems. Furthermore, they suggested that
early detection of changes can be enabled by incorporating end user input early in product
development, and validating design concepts early using available software tools. The third way
to manage engineering changes, according to Fricke et al., is to selectively implement only those
that are necessary and useful. Fully estimating the effects of every such change would require a
systems view. The estimation can also be facilitated by referring to similar engineering changes
made in past product development efforts. Fourth, the authors proposed that engineering
changes should be implemented to derive the maximum benefit with minimum resources.
Effective communication can ensure that all relevant parties understand the requirements of the
change, thereby implementing a change with the right resources at the right time. Finally, the
authors proposed that product development organizations should learn from past engineering
changes. This requires the product development organization to understand the causes and
impacts of engineering changes it may wish to learn from.
159 Discussion of effects of changes is based on pp.602-603 of the paper.




Kick's thesis was motivated by the need to better integrate diverse technical disciplines
and people from different organizations into a complete system product 162. The research was
done as a 7-month internship for Leaders for Manufacturing program at MIT 163
The thesis documented Kick's internship experience in establishing a single-document
control process, and an expanded process to manage the system level configuration of an
unprecedented product for the company at which he conducted the internship. It also contained
a thorough discussion on the fundamentals of configuration management, and highlighted some
interface issues across functional organizations. Another notable feature is that the thesis
provided an enlightening discussion on differences between Class 1 and Class 2 engineering
changes. Overall, the thesis was not about engineering changes themselves, but rather about
structures to manage them during the development of a complex product.
Hypotheses Tested/Questions Asked
Two main research ideas were the focus 64:
* Controlling design and documentation changes during product development
* System-level processes to integrate diverse technical disciplines.
Since the field-research experience focused on configuration management, the research areas were
studied from the perspective of configuration management.
Research Method
The research method was Kick's internship itself, and the lessons learned were based on
establishing two related configuration management processes, and review of appropriate
literature 65. The processes were established and implemented by Kick at a product development
program at a private firm that was developing a new imaging system that was unprecedented for
161 Kick, Mitchell Edward. A System Level Configuration Control Process. MIT Master of Science in Management
and Master of Science Thesis. May 1993.162 Kick: 1993, pp.11-13.
163 Kick: 1993, p. 13 .
164 Taken directly from Kick: 1993, p. 15 .
165 Kick: 1993, p. 12 7
.
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the firm in terms of the product's market, high software content, nature and number of interfaces
between technical components (hardware, software, and media), and high interdependency of
functional organizations that must be integrated to develop the product 66
Based on the two research areas and the research environment, the author established and
implemented two configuration management processes 67. The first was meant to control the
Software Requirements Specification, the second was meant to manage the changes that would
impact the entire system being designed.
Findings
The findings and lessons learned are based on literature review and on the experiences of
one program at one company. Instead of describing the configuration management processes
implemented by Kick, this section highlights the lessons learned regarding the integration of
diverse technologies and functional organizations 168 . The lessons are summarized below.
* Technologies are different. People tend to specialize in certain fields. Consequently, they
don't understand system-level issues.
* Lack of systems knowledge. Systems being developed contain advanced and interdependent
technologies that it is difficult to understand all of them.
* Language barriers. Once again, a factor related to specialization of disciplines.
* Organizational behavior factors. Here Kick addressed the issue of the organization being
entrenched in practices optimized for its previous products, and unable to modify its
processes in time to accommodate the unprecedented imaging system.
It is precisely due to these difficulties, Kick argued, that system-level processes like the system-
level configuration management process1 69 he implemented can effect collaboration among the
disparate technical disciplines and organizations through early and effective communications.
It is noted here that more discussion on experiences, successes, and problems of
implementing integrative processes can be found in Hernandez1 70 and Browning' 71
166 Kick: 1993, pp. 13 - 14 .
16 Kick: 1993, p. 15 .
168 The discussions below are based on Chapter 6 of Kick's thesis.




Hooper's thesis reported on evaluation of the Boeing 777 electrical wiring system error
corrective action process and his recommendations for improvements for the process. Making
the Electrical Corrective Action Process (ECAP) more efficient was important because the more
errors eliminated/corrected more quickly by design and electrical wiring personnel, the shorter the
manufacturing cycle time of the aircraft would be; thus an improved process was important to
Boeing's goal of raising production rate of the 777 aircraft in order to better adapt the delivery
schedule to airlines' needs173.
It is important to understand that Hooper's study focused on the process to solve errors
in design and production of the 777's electrical wiring system, not on the design or planning
process 174. Furthermore, it is useful to note that design changes encountered by Hooper were
categorized into four types 175:
1. Errors that must be fixed. These errors precludes the completion of the electrician's work, or
may lead to safety problems, and are always made known to designers.
2. Errors that need not be fixed. These can be worked around.
3. Design improvements.
4. Errors of clarity. These have to do with unclear instructions.
Overall, the study was based on one production sub-process of a product at a single
company. It is a case study that contains rich details about its subject.
Hypotheses Tested/Questions Asked
170 Hernandez, Christopher M. Challenges and Benefits to the Implementation oflIntegrated Product Teams on
Large Military Procurements. MIT Master of Science in Management Thesis. June 1995.
171 Browning, Tyson R. Systematic IPT Integration in Lean Development Programs. MIT Master of Science in
Technology and Policy and Master of Science in Aeronautics and Astronautics Thesis. June 1996.
172 Hooper, Eric Allen. Improving the Boeing 777 Program's Corrective Action Process. MIT Master of Science in
Electrical Engineering and Master of Science in Management Thesis. May 1996.
173 Hooper: 1996, pp.9 - 1 1.
174 Hooper: 1996, p. 1 1.175 For a full discussion on these types, see pp.33-37 of Hooper's thesis.
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Based on the content of the thesis, the implicit research questions were76:
* Does the existing Boeing 777 Electrical Corrective Action Process (ECAP) meet the basic
requirements of a corrective action process?
* What lessons from the 777 product development phase might be extracted and applied to
improve the ECAP?
Research Method
Hooper's work was one case study based on the Boeing 777 Electrical Corrective Action
Process. Production related data were collected by Hooper and included in the appendices of his
thesis. It was a 7-month effort during which he spent two months shadowing a line manager.
Findings
Hooper outlined four major findings regarding his research subject, and they are
summarized here17 7 per Hooper's wording:
1. Inter-functional collaboration and communications led to the success of the 777 Program's
design phase; they can lead to the success of the sustaining production phase as well.
2. An effective corrective action process resolves errors quickly, enables the communication of
all errors, and enables the participating organizations to learn from their mistakes. In so
doing, it enables the inter-functional collaboration and communication that allow the
participants to improve the process that tie them together.
3. The ECAP as it exists today does not satisfy all the requirements of a corrective action
process.
4. The ECAP's performance can be improved through an approach similar to the one used from
the beginning of the program's design phase: philosophical changes can lead to structural
changes which can in turn lead to behavioral changes.
Five.major impacts of wiring errors were also noted by Hooper: 78
176 The questions were mainly derived from Section 1.2 of Hooper's thesis: a discussion on his project's goals and
assumption.
177 Detailed version of the findings are included in Chapter 8 of Hooper's thesis.
Details shown in Chapter 3, pp.27-32.
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1. Increased production and design cost. He described it as many people from many disciplines
would have to spend time apart from other duties to deal with errors.
2. Increased support and administrative costs. These have to do with personnel dedicated to
dealing with the errors.
3. Variable process flows and assembly times. Production may deviate from plan due to the
fact that personnel having to take time to correct the errors.
4. Reduced product consistency. Different electricians may work around similar errors using
different methods, so products are not exactly the same.
5. Low employee morale. Since cycle time reduction was high priority, employees felt the
pressure to react to errors by coming up with work-arounds to fix design problems, instead of
producing aircraft.
An additional item, although not noted in Hooper's thesis as one of the findings, is
nevertheless a valuable lesson learned from his research. It has to do with the limits of computer-
aided design (CAD) tools like Boeing's CATIA as used at the company at the time of Hooper's
research. Hooper noted in Section 2.3 of his thesis that one cannot assume the ability to
anticipate all production problems simply because a computer tool has simulation capability. In
terms of the wire bundles he studied, many production errors were due to wire lengths not having
accounted for bends and bulges that CATIA could not capture since CATIA modeled a wire
bundle as a rigid tube. In this case, the CAD tool created the need to make design changes while
at the same time prevented many others. Nevertheless, Hooper's discussion of this limitation
highlighted the necessity to explicitly understand the simulation tools.
Wright 79
Background
The intent of Wright's paper was to provide a survey of documented research on
engineering changes. Wright defined an engineering change as "...a modification to a component of
179 Wright, I. C. "A review of research into engineering change management: implications for product design."
Design Studies, Vol.18, 1997. pp.3 3- 4 2 .
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a product, after that product has entered production."'18  At the end of Wright's paper, the
directions suggested for future engineering change-related studies helped shape the research
documented in this thesis.
Hypotheses Tested/Questions Asked
The content of Wright's paper provided insight into the questions the author wanted to
answer. Wright has provided views on:
* What directions and emphases had research in engineering changes adopted since 1980?
* Can any trend be established based on the findings of these efforts?
* What gaps of knowledge can be identified based on these findings?
Research Methodm8 1
Fifty-eight papers related to engineering changes from the 1980-1995 period were selected
from 200 abstracts and read in full by Wright. The paper discussed 15 of the 58 papers, plus
eight others. There was no indication as to why these papers were specifically chosen to be
highlighted.
In addition, Wright also reviewed the funded research in UK that had to do with
engineering changes. The data in this regard came from the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council (EPSRC).
Findings
Wright was able to classify the papers according to their emphases: 1) use of computer-
aided design tools to minimize the need for engineering changes, and modify documents that are
impacted by engineering changes; and 2) engineering change management methods182 . The author
observed papers in the first category tended to be product specific, while those in the latter
category tended to be more general 83
180 Wright: 1997, p.3 3 .
181 Summarized from Wright: 1997, p.3 4 .
182 Wright: 1997, p.40.
183 Wright: 1997, p.34
.
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Other observations were also noteworthy. First, Wright acknowledged having been
unable to find engineering change studies based on business processes perspective 84. Consistent
with the first observation, Wright also noted that engineering change research have been done
from the manufacturing perspective, and perhaps future engineering change research should study
how changes can be the tool for product improvement1 .
Author Wright named several engineering change (EC)-related areas that were thought to
be lacking in research'86 :
1. How do the reasons for, and purposes of, EC vary in different industrial environments?
2. Can companies take market effectiveness into account when assessing the benefits of
proposed EC? What appropriate metrics can be determined to assess these criteria?
3. How can the marketing and design functions estimate the downstream costs of a proposed
EC, rather than leaving this assessment to an EC management committee?
4. Is there a correlation between the number or type of engineering changes processed by
company and the market competitiveness of its products?
5. What are the characteristics of activities and communication channels in an effective EC
management control system?
6. To what extent does EC effectiveness influence design performance?
7. What does an EC process map look like from the marketing and design function point of
view?
8. How does this map vary from that perceived from the manufacturing, production and
inventory viewpoints, and how might these variations be accommodated?
9. What are effective and efficient EC processes, and can these be defined on type and generic
bases?
What must be considered when using literature review results and trends such as those
provided by Wright? It is important to bear in mind that 10 of the 23 highlighted works came
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184 Wright: 1997, p.4 0 .
185 Wright: 1997, p.4 2 .
186 Taken from Wright: 1997, pp.41-42.
from production- and inventory-related sources 187. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect these
papers to address issues of concern to the production and inventory communities, as opposed to
the product development community. It is not clear then, whether the dominance is due to
Wright's biases in selecting the papers to review, or the fact that much of engineering change-
related work was done by the production and inventory communities. Combining the findings of
Wright and the other works reviewed for this present research, it is reasonable to place more
credibility onto the second possibility: many engineering change -related studies have been
conducted from the manufacturing perspective addressing the design-manufacturing interface.
187 The sources included Production and Inventory Management and conference proceedings of the American
Production and Inventory Control Society.
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Appendix B. Existing Frameworks for Categorizing Causes of
Engineering Changes
This appendix documents the review of four frameworks with which causes of
engineering changes have been previously studied in the literature and in practice. They are
reviewed using the three criteria stated in Section 2.5: examine various product development
issues, provide a systems view of US defense aerospace product development, and extract
lessons learned.
Coughlan 88
The company that supported Coughlan's research has been categorizing reasons for
manufacturability-related engineering changes using the framework shown in Table B-1. It is












Table B-1: Reasons for manufacturability-related engineering changes documented in
Coughlan's work
Examine a Variety ofProduct Development Issues
As Coughlan has indicatedl 89, the categories have been used by the divisions in the
company to study manufacturing-related engineering changes. The contribution of product
"88 Coughlan, Paul D. "Engineering Change and Manufacturing Engineering Deployment in New Product
Development" Integrating Design and Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage. Gerald Susman, Ed. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1992. pp. 15 7 -17 7 .
189 Coughlan: 1992, p. 16 5
.
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development to the need for the changes might have been addressed by "Design correction",
"Design improvement", and "Document change".
On the other hand, the framework discussed in Coughlan's paper and shown in Table B-l
does not explicitly study product development in detail. For example, it is impossible to
determine whether a "Design correction" engineering change was related requirements definition,
or any other process. For another example, should the company be interested in understanding
how marketing may influence the design changes by forcing the incorporation of any "New
feature," it is unlikely to determine the magnitude of this influence.
The remaining categories in Table B-l focus on manufacturing or the design-manufacturing
interface. For example, "Yield improvement" and "Material Substitution" relate directly to
manufacturing. It is unclear which aspect of cost "Cost reduction" addresses. Is it specifically
the cost of production, or the life cycle cost of the product? Overall, the framework included in
Coughlan's study retains a manufacturing focus.
Provide Systems View of US Defense Aerospace Product Development
Since it appears that the framework was meant to concentrate on the manufacturing and
the design-manufacturing interface within divisions of a company, it may be adequate to bound
the "system" to that one interface. Therefore, the framework in its present form appears unable
to provide a systems view of defense aerospace product development simply because there are
more organizations and cross-organizational interfaces than this framework can explicitly address.
Extract Lessons Learned
The purpose of Coughlan's research was to address the role of manufacturing engineers in
reducing engineering changes 190. Coughlan and the company at which he conducted research also
examined the variation of man-hours manufacturing engineers spent on the development of new
products as. function of development phase. Lessons were then drawn from correlation of the
data sets. Therefore, the framework as shown in Table B-1 was suitable for extracting certain
lessons learned.
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The framework for categorizing causes of engineering changes, according to Fricke et al., is





* Failure of simulation to identify all effects of an change
2 Human factors
* Imperfect decision-making ability in the face of technical complexity
* Insufficient communication/coordination among people doing different
tasks
* Incentive structure inadvertently encourage late reporting of changes
* Decision makers wanted the change (otherwise unnecessary)
3 Planning/Management factors
* Insufficient planning related to coordination with external suppliers
* Planned processes impossible to implement
* Faulty process planning
* Needed information unavailable when a process calls for it
Table B-2: Framework for categorizing causes of engineering changes by Fricke et al. 19 2
Examine a Variety of Product Development Issues
This framework allows the consideration of a variety of issues relevant to both product
development and manufacturing. In fact, the authors intended to "...understand the nature of
changes over the whole life-cycle of a system."'193 Elements of each of the three causes listed in
Table B-2 can be applicable to many life cycle phases of a system.
Provide Systems View of US Defense Aerospace Product Development
The framework in Table B-2 provides a systems view for development of complex
products, and can potentially be suitable for studying causes of engineering changes in US
defense aerospace product development. For example, sub-categories under both "Human
factors" and "Planning/management factors" can be applied to interactions between individuals
191 Fricke, Ernst & Bernd Gebhard, et al. "No Innovation Process without Changes, but..." Proceedings of Seventh
Annual International Symposium of the International Council on Systems Engineering Vol. 1. Los Angeles, CA:
August 3-7, 1997. pp.6 0 1-6 0 8 .
192 Bulleted items paraphrased from the paper.
193 Fricke et al.: 1997, p. 6 0 1.
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and between organizations. Therefore, the framework allows the examination of interface issues
as possible contributors of engineering changes.
Extract Lessons Learned
In common with the framework discussed by Coughlan, the three major causes of
engineering changes Fricke et al. discussed can allow the extraction of lessons learned as long as
other data are available. Fricke et al.'s framework has already implied that data other than the
number of engineering changes due to each cause should be collected. For example, insights into
communications among communities would be gained when studying "Human factors" as a
possible cause of engineering changes because the category forces an investigation into whether
there is in fact insufficient communication among parties.
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DCMC's Categorization of Class I ECPs 194
One of the duties of the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) is monitoring
the progress of all Department of Defense contracts 95 . The DCMC has been studying Class I
engineering changes according to the framework shown in Table B-3.
Reasons for Class I
ECPs under DCMC
framework
1 Design error ECPs
* Improve performance to meet requirements
* Eliminate interface incompatibilities
* Eliminate hazardous conditions




* Implement other requests (changes requirements or specifications)
3 Improvement ECPs
* Eliminate environmental hazards
* Improve manufacturing or performance beyond requirements
4 Other
* Add sources to control drawings
* Update material requirements
* Replace obsolete parts
Table B-3: DCMC framework for categorizing reasons for Class I ECPs'9 6
Examine a Variety of Product Development Issues
Since the categorization has been designed to study Class I ECPs in a wide variety of
Department of Defense (DoD) prime contracts, it accounts for activities that are done during all
phases of design and production. For example, an ECP implemented to "improve performance to
meet requirements" under "Design error ECPs" can arise during detail design, after a test, or after
the system has entered field service. Furthermore, the need to "replace obsolete parts" under
"Other" can arise during design or production. Therefore, this framework is not limited to
manufacturing.
Provide Systems View of US Defense Aerospace Product Development
194 Details referred to here can be found in DCMC Metrics Guide Book, Fourth ed. Ft. Belvoir, VA. Downloadable
from World Wide Web as PDF file from http://www.dcmc.hq.dla.mil and follow the hot link "Metrics under the
column "Regulations & Manuals".
195 Based on interview with a DCMC representative. 14 April 1998.
196 DCMC Metrics Guidebook, p.73.
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Although the existing framework can be more than adequate for examining many prime
contractors performing to thousands of DoD prime contracts, and consolidating all ECP data at
one agency (the DCMC), it may be too high-level to examine the interfaces between parties
within individual product development programs. For example, writing an ECP to respond to a
request to change specifications places the ECP as a "Requirements ECP" as shown in Table B-3.
According to observations made during data collection for this present research, it is possible that
such a request is driven by the need to administratively prepare specifications for an upcoming
milestone review, or the request can be driven by the fact that the approved design baseline of
one program is impacted by baseline shifts of another program. Therefore, the DCMC
framework does not show the interactions between the two programs, which might be driving the
need to do a large number of ECPs on some programs.
Extract Lessons Learned
The DCMC framework appears to be adequate for the purpose of learning high-level
lessons about a large number of DoD prime contracts by a single agency. However, since
extracting lessons about the management of a small number of specific programs requires detailed
knowledge about the programs, doing so may be beyond the scope of the DCMC framework
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MIL-STD-480B Class I ECP Justification Codes'97
These justification codes from MIL-STD-480B explain why a Class I ECP is beneficial to
the government ' 98 . Each code and its definition are shown in Table B-4.





* Elimination of incompatibility at the interface of key elements of the
system
3 Code C
* Correction of deficiency discovered during functional check-outs or
installation
4 Code D
* Correction of deficiency (when no other code applies)
5 Code O
* Significant effectiveness change to operational or logistical support
6 Code P
* Prevention of production stoppage or delay
7 Code R
* Reduction of present cost for the customer
8 Code S
* Correction of a hazardous deficiency
9 Code V
* Life cycle cost reduction
Table B-4: MIL-STD-480B framework for categorizing necessity of Class I ECPs'99
Examine a Variety ofProduct Development Issues
The framework provided by MIL-STD-480B allows the examination of defense
aerospace product development issues. Based on the definitions of the codes themselves, the
framework encompasses issues that arise over the life cycle of a system. It addresses everything
from contracting to design deficiencies, and operation and support characteristics.
Provide Systems View of US Defense Aerospace Product Development
This framework provides a systems view of the product development and acquisition
process, and the products themselves. For example, Code B is for ECPs that fix incompatibility
between key subsystems. According the observations made while collecting data for this
'
97 MIL-STD-480B Configuration Control - Engineering Changes, Deviations and Waivers. 15 July 1988. The
newer MIL-STD-973 is similar to, and superseded 480B, but no copy of 973 was available. Section 5.1.3 of 480B
defines each justification code.
198 MIL-STD-480B: 1988, Section 5.1.3.
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research, it is possible that these subsystems are managed by different program offices. Code B
does not exclude this possibility.
Extract Lessons Learned
Similar to the DCMC framework reviewed previously, the ECP Justification Codes are
mainly for monitoring a large number of items of interest, not for studying individual programs in
detail. The application of the framework requires knowledge about the contract governing a
program, not knowledge about the history and management practices used in the program.
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'99 Paraphrasing is used in the table to ensure clarity. Exact language can be found in MIL-STD-480B, Section
5.1.3.
Appendix C. Interview Questions for Contractor and Program Office
Personnel
Interview Questions for Contractor Personnel
Note: The term "Programs" is used to represent the three case study programs. In addition, the
term "company" represents the contractor company at which the interview was conducted.
Product Development Process
1. Please describe the product development process with respect to program phases in the
Programs.
2. Please describe the company's internal engineering change/configuration management
process at the Programs. How does the process depend on the program phase?
Nature of the System
3. Name of the system
4. Date on which requirements definition work on the system began
5. For this system, what level of specifications does the customer control
6. Please list the suppliers (mainly first tier) for this system:
Technology of the System
7. Please describe the system's technology content, i.e., generation of the processors,
version of programming language, etc.
8. Please list the major components of the system
9. Given available choices of technology, what were the factors that led to the chosen
technology? In other words, who or what decided which choice to go with?
10. At any phase of the program to which the system belongs, have the requirements for the
system been changed by the customer to accommodate a new technology?
Use of Integrated Product Team (IPT) Structure
Please note: These questions will be modified based on how the developmental efforts were
organized at the company)
11. Was the IPT structure used to develop this system? Yes No
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12. At what phase of the program was the IPT structure used for this system
13. Did suppliers participate in the development effort for this system? Yes No
If Yes, please describe the nature of the their involvement and what type of personnel
(engineers, managers, production personnel, etc.) from the suppliers participated.
14. Did the customer participate in the development efforts? Yes No
If Yes, please describe the nature of the their involvement and what type of personnel
from the customer participated.
15. Did the company's production personnel participate in the development of this system?
Yes No
If Yes, please describe the nature of the their involvement and what type of personnel
from production participated.
16. Of the prime contractor, suppliers, and customer, which party makes the final
technical decisions regarding a system? How does the authority change as program
progresses?
Experiences with CAD/CAM as a Communications Tool
17. Was CAD/CAM the primary communications tool between the company's
Programs and their suppliers? Yes No
How has the use affected the need to make engineering changes?
18. Was CAD/CAM the primary communications tool between the company's
Programs and their customers? Yes No
How has the use affected the need to make engineering changes?
Interview Questions for Program Office Personnel
General Information
1. Name of Program:
2. Personnel in program IPT:
3. Prime contractor(s) for this program:
4. Subcontractor(s) for this program:
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5. Contracts over which the program has jurisdiction:
Phases and Budget
6. Product development phases and their beginning & end dates:
Contract Contract Contract Contract Nominal Actual Original Contract Remarks
number type content award closeout closeout contract amount
date date date amount to date
7. Description of types of decisions made during each phase:
Top-level Program Management
8. Phase during which the IPT structure was first used by the prime contractor for this
program:
9. Which level of contractors does the SPO program IPT have jurisdiction over?
(1=both the prime contractors and all subcontractors, 2=prime contractors and 1st tier
subcontractors only, 3=prime contractors only)
Technology Decisions
10. The program seeks to incorporate newest technology into the subsystems for which it is
responsible___ (Yes= 1, No=0)
11. The program seeks to incorporate the most reliable (lowest risk in terms of cost, schedule,
and performance), but not necessarily the most modem, technology into the systems for
which it is responsible (Yes=l, No=O)
Additional Details & Subsystems Listing
12. Background information about the program:
13. Systems for which this program is responsible (Reasons for technology choice: 1=lowest
cost, 2=COTS, 3=most reliable, 4=newest technology, 5=best performance in terms of
processing time, etc.) Part of this question may not be appropriate for the project level
System Spec number Functionality Technology 3 major reasons Funds spend on
name content for technology system to date
choice
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Appendix D. Causes of Engineering Changes: Time-Based Data
Normalization
The Appendix lists and briefly discusses the available results from normalization of
engineering change data in Chapter 4 by using only the data with the first 3.5 years of available
data from each program. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this approach had the shortcoming of
ignoring the similarity of the programs in terms the phase they were in when this research began.
E
6 50%M 50% -42.9%
O o Program A (21)
9 40%- 33.3% aProgram B (19)29.6%
30% 6.3% 26.3% mProgram C (27)
U 21.1% 19.0%
, 20% - 15.8% 14.3% 14.8%
10% . .4% 7.4% 3 03S3.7% 4.8/ .7%
O.0
C Reqmts Changes in Fix deficiencies Govt-prime Program-to- Technology Documentation
- definition issues needs interactn program change changes
interactn
Primary Causes
Based on a total of 67 engineering changes from the first 3.5 years of each of the three programs.
Figure D-1: Time-normalized primary causes of engineering changes
Some differences in the patterns of the data with and without this normalization are
noted. When Figure D-1 above is compared to Figure 4-9, it is clear that many of Program A's
engineering changes due primarily to the need to fix deficiencies happened late (beyond the first
3.5 years) in the program, and were thus excluded. Furthermore, the relative importance of the
need to realign documentation as a primary cause of engineering changes in Program A seemed to
have been increased by this normalization. Program A ECP descriptive data showed that there
were many engineering changes that were done to simply realign documentation during the
program's first 3.5 years. Such engineering changes were retained by the normalization. In
addition, the normalization seems to also have diminished the importance of changes in
technology as one of the dominant primary causes of engineering changes in Program B. An
examination of the ECP descriptive data would indicate that technology-related engineering
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changes in Program B were implemented more recently. Thus, many of them were excluded by
this normalization.
The aggregated results across the three program also show changes in needs to be one of
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Based on a total of 67 engineering changes from the first 3.5 years of each of the three programs.
Figure D-2: Time-normalized dominant causes of engineering changes across the three
programs
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Appendix E. Primary Causes Over Time
This appendix shows the data for the analysis of the relationship between primary causes
of engineering changes and time. Each cluster of plots represents each high-level cause of
engineering changes discussed in Section 3.3. Data from each of the three case-study programs
are represented in each row within each cluster of plots. The left-hand-side column shows data
using all engineering changes in the three programs, while the right-hand-side column shows data
based on engineering changes affecting only the system specification (SS) and/or mission system
specification (MSS). It is useful to note that Program C engineering change data do not require
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Time Distribution of Program A Engineering Changes
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Time Distribution of Program A Engineering Changes
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